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THE PUZZLING ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC
POWER IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Ganesh Sitaraman†

Six years after the financial crash, disparities in economic
power are at the forefront of popular debate. Political leaders
increasingly express a growing popular sentiment that “the
system is rigged” to work for wealthy and corporate interests
who have the means to buy influence through campaign funding and then sustain their influence with “armies of lobbyists”
in Washington. In a battery of studies over the last decade,
political scientists have confirmed populist suspicions and
demonstrated that economic elites dominate the American political system. Their findings operate across all areas of policy, and they provide systematic empirical evidence that
political influence is tilted in favor of the wealthiest members
of American society.
With rare exception, however, the power of economic
elites—and the empirical evidence for this power—has been
largely invisible from macro-level contemporary debates in
constitutional theory. Most of the time, constitutional theorists
have in mind a more optimistic view of American politics that
both undergirds and serves as an aspiration for their approach to constitutional theory and design. Republicans focus
on deliberation toward the public good. Pluralists celebrate (or
fear) group participation. Some worry about protecting minority rights from majoritarianism; others criticize the undemocratic structures within the constitutional system. And
recently, there have been efforts to bring greater political realism to constitutional theory, particularly by focusing on the
intersection of partisan affiliation and constitutional structure.
What is puzzling, however, is that none of these approaches
engage directly or systematically with the power of economic
elites in American politics. And yet, none of these approaches
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can be truly successful—even on their own terms—without
grappling with the realities of economic power.
Contemporary constitutional theory needs to be rooted in
a more realistic description of the American political process.
This Article first argues that leading debates in constitutional
theory have failed to engage with the reality of elite economic
domination and that without taking into account the role economic elites play in American politics, these theories have serious limitations even on their own terms. Second, it shows that
any attempt to design institutions to account for the influence
of economic power will face persistent, pervasive, and perverse problems. A central task of constitutional theory going
forward must be to overcome or at least mitigate these stumbling blocks. Third, it provides a conceptual framework of
possible, albeit imperfect, design options for mitigating elite
economic domination. There are a variety of design strategies
for grappling with economic power, which cover a wide range
in both plausibility and efficacy. Given the persistent
problems involved in mitigating the influence of economic
power, it is not likely there will be any one single “solution.”
Constitutional theory will instead need to consider a secondbest approach in which multiple suboptimal strategies are
adopted, in hopes that the system as a whole is relatively
desirable.
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INTRODUCTION
Six years after the financial crash, disparities in economic
power are at the forefront of popular debate. There is widespread concern about rising inequality and the increasing
share of wealth going to the top 1% and 0.1% of people.1 Outrage over the policy of bailouts for Wall Street banks flows from
both the Tea Party right and the Occupy Wall Street left.2 Political leaders increasingly express a growing popular sentiment
that “the system is rigged” to work for wealthy and corporate
interests, who have the means to buy influence through cam1
See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)
(noting capitalism’s tendency to generate wealth inequality and speculating that
this trend will continue in the twenty-first century).
2
Conor Friedersdorf, Why the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street Should
Cooperate, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2011/10/why-the-tea-party-and-occupy-wall-street-should-cooperate/
246413/ [https://perma.cc/WX25-ZVS2].
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paign funding and then sustain their influence with “an army
of lobbyists” in Washington.3
These fears are well founded. In a battery of studies over
the last decade, political scientists have confirmed populist
suspicions and demonstrated that economic elites dominate
the American political system.4 The wealthy participate more
at every stage of the political process—from meeting candidates, to donating, to voting.5 Elite economic interest groups
(business and industry) make up the majority of interest
groups and spend the most money on lobbying.6 And the
wealthy’s preferences diverge significantly from the majority of
Americans.7 When median-wealth Americans’ preferences do
make it into law, political scientists have shown that this is
almost invariably a function of “democracy by coincidence”:
median-wealth preferences happen to align with those of the
wealthy.8 When preferences diverge, studies show that majority preferences have effectively no impact on policy outcomes,
while the preferences of economic elites and elite economic
interest groups are strong predictors.9 These findings operate
across all areas of policy,10 and they provide systematic empirical evidence that political influence is tilted in favor of the
wealthiest members of American society.
Despite the rigor, breadth, and relevance of these findings,
the power of economic elites—and the empirical evidence for
this power—has been largely invisible from contemporary debates in constitutional theory. To the extent economic issues
are a central part of the conversation at the macro-level in
constitutional law, they are generally raised by libertarians and
3
See Elizabeth Warren, Speech to the Democratic National Convention
(Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/05/elizabeth-warrenspeech-text_n_1850597.html [https://perma.cc/QM97-SMXX].
4
See infra Part I for a full discussion of the issues in this paragraph.
5
See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS 13–21, 117–33 (2012).
6
See id. at 404–11.
7
See generally Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51
(2013) (finding that the top 1% and .01% of U.S. wealth-holders are less supportive than the remaining American public of progressive taxation, economic regulation, and social welfare programs).
8
See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573 (2014).
9
See id. at 571–73.
10
See generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 97–123 (2012) (demonstrating inequality in government responsiveness to more- and less-affluent Americans on substantive
policy issues, such as foreign policy, economic policy, religious policy issues, and,
to a lesser extent, social welfare policy issues).
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classical liberals,11 whose central concern is not disparities in
economic power. With some notable exceptions,12 those who
are worried about concentrated economic power have focused
at the more micro-level within particular constitutional and
regulatory arenas, namely the law of democracy (specifically
campaign finance reform),13 property law and takings,14 corporate First Amendment rights,15 and union political
participation.16
At the macro-level, however, contemporary constitutional
theory engages with the fact of elite economic domination in
politics less frequently. Most of the time, constitutional theorists seem to have in mind a more optimistic view of American
politics that both undergirds and serves as an aspiration for
their approach to constitutional theory and design. Republicans focus on deliberation toward the public good.17 Pluralists
celebrate (or fear) group participation.18 Some worry about
protecting minority rights from majoritarianism; others criticize the undemocratic structures within the constitutional sys11
See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2014)
(offering a libertarian analysis); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING Lochner (2011)
(same); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014) (offering a
classical liberal perspective).
12
See generally Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669 (2014) (arguing that the Constitution embodies
an anti-oligarchy principle and tracing the evolution of this principle throughout
American history); see also Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and
the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST.. L. 419, 481-87 (2015)
(explaining that highly organized wealth undermines the separation of powers
rooted within the American constitutional structure); David Singh Grewal &
Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,
14–19 (2014) (analyzing and criticizing the neoliberal approach to legal issues).
13
The literature is voluminous. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC,
LOST 89–127 (2011) (describing the corrosive effects of money on democratic government); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 227–45 (2014) (tracing the
history of what constitutes corruption).
14
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV.
741, 767–92 (1999) (discussing the relationship between property takings and
egalitarian ideals).
15
See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1453, 1495–1513 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence as supporting Lochner-style economic goals). For a recent assessment of
First Amendment theory, see generally ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED (2014)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment in the
context of Citizens United).
16
See Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective
Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148, 182–98 (2013) (calling for a separation of unions’
collective bargaining and political functions, thereby enabling unions to more
actively engage in political organizing and to act as a voice for the lower and
middle classes).
17
See infra subpart II.A.
18
See infra subpart II.A & section II.C.1.
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tem.19 And recently, there have been efforts to bring greater
political realism to constitutional theory, particularly by focusing on the intersection of partisan affiliation and constitutional
structure.20
What is puzzling, however, is that none of these approaches engage directly or systematically with the power of
economic elites in American politics. And yet, none of these
approaches can be truly successful—even on their own
terms—without grappling with the realities of economic power.
For example, one can criticize the anti-majoritarian design of
the Senate—the allocation of senators by state, instead of population.21 But even if the Senate shifted to a population-based
electoral regime, it is still the case that a small group of economic elites would dominate American politics and policymaking and that outcomes would diverge from majority
preferences. That hardly seems to be the kind of “democratic”
system that advocates of such populist proposals aspire to
achieve. Or consider the powerfully important idea of “separation of parties, not powers.”22 While divided government along
party lines might offer a better check than the Madisonian
system of institutional checks and balances, the thesis is limited by an elite economic constraint: if economic elites have
captured both parties, we should not expect divided government to act as a countervailing check on the exercise of power
with respect to issues where elites of both parties share similar
views. Other theories all face similar problems. Without accounting for elite economic domination in the production of
public policy, leading constitutional theories not only limit
their own explanatory and normative power but also fail to
engage one of the central features of American politics. Economic power seems to be the elephant in constitutional theory’s room: everyone knows it is there, but no one
acknowledges it.
This Article seeks to shift constitutional theory’s agenda.
Contemporary constitutional theory needs to be rooted in a
more realistic description of the American political process.
The Article makes three primary contributions. First, it argues
that recent debates in constitutional theory have largely failed
19

See infra section II.C.2.
See infra section II.C.3.
21
See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 50–62 (2006).
22
See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) (asserting that inter-branch competition is best viewed not as a product of constitutional structure but rather as a
function of whether government is unified or divided along party lines).
20
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to engage with the reality of elite economic domination, and
that without taking into account the role economic elites play
in American politics, these theories have serious limitations
even on their own terms. Second, it shows that any attempt to
design institutions to account for the influence of economic
power will face persistent, pervasive, and perverse problems. A
central task of constitutional theory going forward must be to
overcome or at least mitigate these stumbling blocks. Third, it
provides a conceptual framework of possible, albeit imperfect,
design options for mitigating elite economic domination. The
remedy is not so straightforward as “the separation of economic power,” with checks and balances against each other
akin to the old mixed government theories (though that is one
approach discussed). Rather, there are a variety of design
strategies for grappling with economic power, which cover a
wide range in both plausibility and efficacy. Given the persistent problems involved in mitigating the influence of economic
power, it is not likely there will be any one single “solution.”
Constitutional theory will instead need to consider a secondbest approach in which multiple suboptimal strategies are
adopted, in hopes that the system as a whole is relatively
desirable.
In bringing economic power back to the forefront of debates
in constitutional theory, this Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I introduces empirical evidence from political science on
the dominance of economic elites over American politics. It
starts with studies on the various pathways for elite economic
influence: individual participation in politics, economic interest
group influence, and the composition of officials. These studies
demonstrate that elite economic interests have outsized influence over every aspect of the American political system. It then
describes the phenomenon of “democracy by coincidence,” in
which majority preferences are adopted into policy because
elite economic opinion happens to align with public preferences
writ large. However, in situations where elite and majority preferences diverge, studies indicate that majority preferences
have no explanatory power. Finally, Part I introduces research
comparing the success rates of different theories of American
politics for predicting policy outcomes. This work demonstrates that elite economic domination is the central driver in
American public policy.
Part II shows that leading approaches to and debates in
contemporary constitutional theory insufficiently account for
the role economic power plays in American politics. The imbal-
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ance of economic power is relevant to constitutional theory
because a variety of constitutional theories—though by no
means all of them—are predicated on normative or positive
assumptions that make the reality of elite economic domination problematic for the theory on its own terms. These theories cannot succeed without accounting for the influence of
economic elites. Part II considers the Madisonian structure
and shows that, whether by design or inadvertence, the conventional structural understanding of the Constitution inadequately addresses the possibility of economic elites dominating
politics. It then describes some of the most important contemporary debates in constitutional theory over the last quarter
century: interest groups and the countermajoritarian problem,
the undemocratic constitution and popular constitutionalism,
and political parties and partisanship. It shows how these theories and debates ignore (or are at least inadequate in their
treatment of) economic power and how this limits the normative and explanatory power of the theories.
The absence of economic power from these recent debates
is truly puzzling. Historically, economic power has been a persistent concern in constitutional theory. For two thousand
years prior to the eighteenth century, one of the dominant theories of constitutional structure—mixed government—was
predicated on the insight that economic classes would oppress
each other unless each had a check against the other. During
the Progressive Era, Charles Beard penned a famous tract declaring that the Constitution was framed by economic elites
bent on preserving (and promoting) their wealth and status.23
Questions of economic power were also central during the New
Deal era, as commentators and reformers revisited the separation of powers to create a regulatory state strong enough to
confront the massive economic power of industrial and corporate capitalism.24
Perhaps most puzzling is the absence of discussion along
these lines given the recent interest in and documented trends
on economic inequality. Since the financial crash, increasing
disparities in wealth have been at the forefront of public debate, leading to robust discussion on how to address growing
inequality. More strikingly, some economists have even argued
that rising inequality is the natural state of capitalism and that
the relative levels of economic equality in the mid-twentieth
23
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
24
See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7, 36, 46, 120 (1938).
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century were exceptional, primarily because the two world
wars and Great Depression wiped out the holdings of the
wealthiest.25 If economic inequality is an inevitable feature of
capitalism, and since the 1970s, increasingly part of our experience, we need to think about how institutions can be designed to account for this reality.26
So why have contemporary constitutional theorists not focused on economic power? While a comprehensive answer
would require a thorough intellectual history of the last halfcentury of constitutional scholarship, Part II concludes by
identifying the central reasons why economic power has been
absent from contemporary constitutional theory. First, with
the triumph of the New Deal, a widespread consensus emerged
on the constitutionality of regulating the economy. As a result,
constitutional scholars in the late twentieth century focused
their attention primarily on issues related to race, gender, and
civil rights, leaving economic issues to specific subfields like
takings and campaign finance. Second, the absence of economic power seems to have been a function of two intellectual
trends: the rise of republicanism and its displacement of materialistic approaches to constitutional history, and the dominance of neoliberalism in economic thought. Third, although
economic inequality has been growing since the late 1970s, the
rise of highly-indebted two-income households helped prop up
the middle class until the 2000s. Finally, inequality simply did
not become publicly salient until the 2000s, and more specifically, until after the 2008 financial crisis.
To make progress, constitutional theory needs to grapple
with the reality of economic power. But that may be easier said
than done. As Part III shows, constitutional theory faces a
series of pervasive, persistent, and even perverse problems
with respect to institutional designs that correct for imbalances
in economic power. First, the inside-outside problem suggests
that we cannot seek remedies from within a political system
that we have diagnosed as opposed to those remedies. Second,
the hydraulics of economic influence, a concept from campaign
finance reform, suggests that money will inevitably find a way
to influence political decisionmaking whatever design strategies are adopted. Third, the paradox of process, a concept from
administrative law, holds that as procedural safeguards increase to preserve democratic access or rights, elite economic
25

See PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 290–96, 371–76.
See David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626,
661–67 (2014) (reviewing PIKETTY, supra note 1).

R
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interests will perversely be better able to navigate those complexities. Fourth, political theorists have argued that elections
are an inherently aristocratic mode of selecting officials, particularly when compared to lottery systems, posing a challenge to
any election-based system. Finally, design options that overtly
recognize economic inequality might suffer from the hazard of
entrenching economic class and thereby undermine attempts
to mitigate class-identification. While Part III notes some possible remedies, these persistent problems show that constitutional theory faces significant challenges in addressing
economic power.
The unfortunate result is that institutional design solutions to address economic power are likely to be imperfect.
Still, there are ways to mitigate the influence of economic
power. Part IV provides a four-category conceptual framework
for considering strategies that grapple with economic power in
politics, and it provides examples of these strategies from law,
theory, and history. The framework identifies ways to constrain economic influence, moving downstream from prevention to mitigation to resignation. The first strategy, countering
economic inequality, seeks to prevent economic inequality in
the first place—prior to its having political influence. It includes a re-imagining of the classic precommitment story of
Ulysses, reframed around economic inequality. The second,
safeguarding the political process, seeks to create a firewall that
will protect politics from economic influence, whether ex ante
or ex post. The third strategy, incorporating countervailing powers into the political process, seeks to level the playing field
between the economically powerful and the less powerful, either through what I call “the separation of economic powers” or
through what scholars have deemed “leveling up” strategies.
The fourth strategy, bypassing the political process, attempts to
establish institutions such as political parties or the bureaucratic state, which are outside the traditional separation of
powers in hopes of preserving a space free of undue economic
influence.
The conceptual framework identifies the different avenues
for attacking the problem of disparate influence based on economic power, and it provides a different way of looking at current structures and policies—one that emphasizes their ability
to restrict undue economic influence. For some, then, the
framework’s contribution will be suggestive in framing the possible approaches to design and identifying specific historical
and theoretical design alternatives. For others, it will be ana-
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lytical, providing an anti-economic-power justification for existing structures and policies. More broadly, the fact that each
approach in the framework suffers from some persistent
problems suggests that constitutional theorists interested in
economic power will need to pursue multiple suboptimal strategies, not a single silver bullet, in order to meet the challenge of
economic power.
Before turning to Part I, a few brief caveats are also in
order. The argument here is not that elite economic preferences are the only factor that matters in American politics.
Rather, it is that empirical evidence shows that they are a
factor and often the dominant factor. As with the literature on
political parties and constitutional theory, the argument is that
ignoring a central driver of American politics leads to systematic skewing of the political and constitutional system. A better
approach is to engage with these factors with eyes open, rather
than hewing blindly to frameworks and theories that are divorced from reality.
A word also on constitutional method and the role of original intent. If one ascribes to the view that the Constitution was
intended to serve the interests of economic elites and that such
an original intent should be respected today, then the findings
of political scientists outlined here simply confirm that the political system is working as intended. For such adherents, this
Article may nonetheless be a relevant and helpful contribution,
as it provides a critique of leading constitutional theories on
their own terms. In contrast, for anyone who is troubled by
economic dominance as a normative matter and believes either
that the Constitution was not rigged from the start to enable
economic elites to dominate political decisionmaking—or that
even if it was, that such an original intent should not control
today—the Article’s contribution is much broader. It suggests
that grappling with the power of economic elites needs to be a
central task for American constitutional theory.
I
THE REALITY OF ELITE ECONOMIC DOMINATION
In recent years, political scientists have turned to the question of how much influence those with economic power have
over American politics and public policy.27 This still-emerging
27
See Larry Bartels, Rich People Rule!, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE, (Apr. 8,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/08/
rich-people-rule/ [https://perma.cc/BT8Q-SZKQ] (noting that this turn in political science is relatively recent). The catalyst, or at least a focal point, for this
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but already voluminous literature confirms empirically what
the famed political scientist E.E. Schattschneider noted in
1975: in politics, “the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”28 This Part presents findings from the political science literature on economic elites and the political
process. The data show that there are stark differences between economic elites and everyone else in the population. The
preferences of economic elites diverge from the rest of the population, and economic elites participate in politics and policymaking to a far greater degree than the rest of the
population. Perhaps more troubling is the disparity of influence between economic elites and everyone else. Some political
scientists have called our system “democracy by coincidence”29
because the majority only gets its way when, by coincidence,
their preferences happen to align with the views of economic
elites.
A few brief methodological notes: First, the political science
studies in this area sometimes use different metrics for identifying economic elites. Because a number of important studies
use the top 10% income bracket as their metric,30 I will use
that as an unstated default throughout this Part when referring to the “wealthy” or “economic elites.” When a study uses a
different metric to define “wealthy” or “economic elites,” I will
specify the study’s metric. Second, although the studies cited
here are from leading political scientists, widely recognized as
some of the most distinguished in their field, some might have
questions about their methodologies. As with all interdisciplinary scholarship, I cannot explain or defend every methodolognewfound attention was Larry Jacobs and Theda Skocpol’s 2003 to 2005 American Political Science Association Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. See INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ix (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda
Skocpol eds., 2005). But some scholars had been toiling on this issue for many
years prior. See, e.g., G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? 1–4 (3d ed. 1998);
THOMAS FERGUSON, GOLDEN RULE: THE INVESTMENT THEORY OF PARTY COMPETITION AND
THE LOGIC OF MONEY-DRIVEN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 8 (1995).
28
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 34–35 (1975).
29
Gilens & Page, supra note 8, at 573.
30
See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 10, at 77; Martin Gilens, Policy Consequences
of Representational Inequality, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED? 247 (Peter K. Enns &
Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011) [hereinafter Gilens, Policy Consequences]; Martin
Gilens, Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 335,
337–40 (2009) [hereinafter Gilens, Preference Gaps]; Martin Gilens, Inequality and
Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778, 783–93 (2005) [hereinafter
Gilens, Democratic Responsiveness]; see also ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE,
BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY AMERICANS VOTE THE WAY THEY DO (2008);
BENJAMIN I. PAGE & LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, CLASS WAR? WHAT AMERICANS REALLY THINK
ABOUT ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 14 (2009); Jeffrey A. Winters & Benjamin I. Page,
Oligarchy in the United States?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 731 (2009).
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ical choice without repeating a decade’s worth of books and
articles. Even with the data’s inevitable limitations in each
study, a consistent pattern emerges across them all. Economic
elites have disproportionate influence over American public
policy.
A. Preferences and Participation
Average citizens’ views do not always align with those of the
economic elites. When political scientists have compared the
preferences of the wealthiest Americans—the top 1% and
0.1%—to the general public, they find stark differences.31 As
people get wealthier, they become more opposed to regulation
and more interested in cutting domestic social programs like
Social Security, education, food stamps, and jobs programs.32
The wealthy think deficits are one of the most important
problems facing the country, compared to the general public,
which is more worried about unemployment and education.33
The wealthiest Americans tend to be far less supportive of increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit or making sure that the
minimum wage can keep workers above the poverty line.34 By
significant majorities, the general public strongly supports
spending whatever is necessary to have good public schools,
and they want to make sure everyone who wants to attend
college can do so; only a minority of the wealthiest Americans
agree with these goals.35 The general public is also far more
supportive of efforts to regulate Wall Street, oil companies, and
big corporations than are the wealthiest Americans.36
Divergences in policy preferences extend to the individuals
and interest groups that participate in politics as well. According to a study of the economic backgrounds of elected officials,
lawmakers who are from different economic backgrounds “tend
to think, vote, and advocate differently on economic issues.”37
31
See generally Page, Bartels & Seawright, supra note 7. The rest of the
citations in this paragraph are all based on comparisons to the top 1% and 0.1%
in income.
32
Id. at 64–65.
33
Id. at 55.
34
Id. at 57.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 61.
37
NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN
ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 3 (2013). In order to determine a legislator’s class,
Carnes focused on occupational background rather than on income, education,
wealth, or other factors. He categorized occupation prior to elected office into ten
categories and also grouped occupations into broader blue-collar and white-collar
categories. Id. at 17–21.
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Similarly, political scientists have shown that views on economic issues diverge between those who are inactive, those
who vote, those who volunteer on campaigns, and those who
donate to campaigns.38 With greater participation (which correlates with economic class), people become more hostile to
economic and social policies that benefit the working class.
Interest group preferences also diverge substantially from the
views of the general public.39 Studies conclude that interest
group views are almost totally uncorrelated to the preferences
of average citizens and business groups’ preferences have a
negative correlation.40
Still, divergent preferences between economic elites and
everyone else might not matter much to political outcomes if
those who participate in politics are drawn from the general
public. But here too political scientists have demonstrated
that participation is skewed toward elites. Those with a higher
socioeconomic status are more likely to vote, engage in political
activities, and especially donate to political campaigns.41 At
the top 1%, levels of access and participation are particularly
notable, with more than half of this group contributing to campaigns and contacting government officials.42 Wealth-based
political inequality holds even when a variety of other factors
are taken into account. For example, stratification by wealth
occurs even when controlling for participation in non-political
social activities (e.g., religion),43 cohort, generational, and life
cycle effects, and race.44 It turns out that the median voter is
not the same as the “median campaign volunteer, the median
campaign donor, or—because contributors give such different
amounts—the person giving the median dollar.”45
38

See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 5, at 126–33.
See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS,
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 16 (2009).
40
See Gilens & Page, supra note 8, at 570–71, 574. Indeed, preferences of
individual economic elites and business groups are even misaligned: the former
often want less government action, whereas the latter sometimes seek support
from the government for their industry. Id. at 571.
41
See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 5, at 122–26, 152–59.
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady use socioeconomic status, for which they created
their own measure, giving equal weight to family income and education level. Id.
at 123 n.9. They explicitly note the similarities of their findings with other measures, particularly those that consider the relationship between income and voting. Id. at 156 n.16.
42
Page, Bartels & Seawright, supra note 7, at 54.
43
See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 5, at 165–66. These authors
rely on socioeconomic status. See id. at 123 n.9
44
See id. at 199, 224, 228, 579.
45
Id. at 233.
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These disparities in participation also extend to interest
groups. Under the classic political science approach to interest
group politics,46 the barriers to entry into politics are sufficiently low that the interest group environment is fluid. Interests spring up easily, entering and exiting politics as relevant
policy debates come to the fore. Early challengers to this rosy
view of interest group theory suggested that the interest group
ecosystem was biased in favor of businesses and the well-todo,47 and more broadly, pointed out that collective action
problems make it difficult for diffuse groups to organize themselves and participate.48
Looking empirically at tens of thousands of lobbying organizations in Washington, D.C., over a thirty-year period,
Professors Kay Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady
have demonstrated that Schattschneider was right: the interest
group environment is, in their play on his classic phrase, an
“unheavenly chorus,” skewed toward business and other elite
economic interests. More than half of organizations that are
active in Washington represent business interests.49 Only
about one in eight organizations are voluntary associations
made up of individuals.50 Very few—less than 1%—of organizations are focused on the poor and social welfare.51 Looking
within categories, the playing field remains tilted. Blue-collar
workers make up 24% of the population but only 6.9% of membership organizations and 1.1% of all economic organizations.52 In contrast, executives (a category they separate from
professionals and general white-collar workers) make up 9.6%
of the population but are represented by 13.9% of membership
organizations and a whopping 73.9% of all economic organiza46
I follow Schlozman, Verba, and Brady, id. at 267–77, in presenting the
classic approach with broad strokes. For precise statements of the theory, see
ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 218 (1908) (describing interest
groups as being “all knit together in a system” because they “brace each other up,
hold each together, move forward by their interactions, and in general are in a
state of continuous pressure upon one another”); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145 (1956) (“I define[ ] the ‘normal’ American political process
as one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in
the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the
process of decision.”); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 503–16 (1951)
(describing the prevalence of and interactions amongst both unorganized and
organized political interest groups).
47
See SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 28, at 35.
48
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
49
SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 5, at 322.
50
Id. at 319.
51
Id. at 331.
52
Id. at 329. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady use census data to categorize
occupations within the broader population. Id. at 328.
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tions.53 Breaking up the categories by sector leads to similar
results. In higher education, for example, 50% of research universities that award doctoral degrees are represented in Washington, compared to 2% of two-year schools.54 This is not due
to two-year schools having no stake in public policy: two-year
schools rely heavily on the Federal Pell Grant Program, just as
research universities rely on federal research dollars. Other
studies have shown that even within groups that advocate for
the disadvantaged, more emphasis is placed on supporting the
sub-groups that are better off rather than those that are worse
off.55
What about elected officials themselves? If they are drawn
from the people, rather than the economic elites, then perhaps
they will advocate for turning average Americans’ preferences
into public policy. Unfortunately, the data does not support
this hypothesis. Less than 2% of members of Congress themselves had working-class jobs before entering public life, and
only 20% were raised in working-class households.56 As of
2014, the median net worth of members of Congress is above a
million dollars.57 In contrast, in 2013, the median net worth of
an American household was $56,335.58 The data look better at
the state and local level but not by much. Only 3% of state
legislators are blue-collar workers themselves and only 9% of
city council members.59 This is nothing new. As Nicholas
Carnes concludes in his study of legislators, “working-class
Americans—who have made up more than 50 percent of the
labor force for at least the last hundred years—have never
made up more than 2 percent of Congress.”60
53

Id. at 329.
Id. at 372.
55
DARA Z. STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 80–96 (2007).
56
CARNES, supra note 37, at 5. For a discussion of Carnes’s methodology, see
id. at 17–21.
57
Russ Choma, Millionaires’ Club: For First Time, Most Lawmakers Are Worth
$1 Million-Plus, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLS. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://
www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/millionaires-club-for-first-time-mostlawmakers-are-worth-1-million-plus/ [https://perma.cc/7PH3-4L9Q].
58
Fabian T. Pfeffer, Sheldon Danziger & Robert F. Schoeni, Wealth Levels,
Wealth Inequality, and the Great Recession, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., June 2014,
http://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/working_papers/pfeffer-danzigerschoeni_wealth-levels.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PMF-FHL8]; Anna Bernasek, The
Typical Household, Now Worth a Third Less, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2014, at 6.
59
CARNES, supra note 37, at 5.
60
Id. at 7 (citations omitted). For a discussion of Carnes’s methodology, see
id. at 17–21.
54
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Political scientists continue to debate whether participation is a causal factor in shaping policy outcomes,61 but they
share the view that the composition of those who participate is
skewed. As the leading study concludes, “the evidence indicates unambiguously that neither active individuals nor active
organizations represent all politically relevant segments of society equally.”62
B. “Democracy by Coincidence”
Even with divergent preferences and differences in participation, it might be the case that there are no disparities in
influence between economic elites and the general public. That
is, even when there are divergent preferences and economic
elites advocate for their preferred policies, representatives
might nonetheless follow the will of the majority when there are
disagreements. Political scientists have tested this possibility—and the results are not encouraging. In a well-known
study of voting patterns in the Senate, Larry Bartels finds that
senators were more responsive to affluent constituents than to
constituents of modest means, and strikingly, that the views of
constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution had
almost no impact whatsoever on the senators’ behavior.63
Martin Gilens has conducted the most comprehensive
study of the relationship between wealth and political influence, based on an analysis of public policy over two decades.
He finds that government policy across all policy areas reflects
the policy preferences of the affluent but is unaffected by the
views of the poor and middle class.64 Gilens assessed the preferences of people at the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth percentiles
in the income distribution in comparison to policy outcomes in
government. As the divergence of preferences increases between the tenth and ninetieth percentile, there are massive
drops in the link between constituent preferences and policy
61
Compare LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 275 (2008) (“Income-related disparities in turnout simply do not seem large enough to provide a plausible
explanation for the income-related disparities in responsiveness documented
here.”) with SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 5, at 118 (“[A]ctivity by both
citizens and organized interests makes a difference for public policy, and, if anything, public officials are disproportionately responsive to the affluent and welleducated members of their constituencies.”).
62
SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 5, at 118.
63
BARTELS, supra note 61, at 253–54. Bartels used National Election Studies
data and, to correct for underrepresentation that is common in telephone surveys,
post-stratified the sample. See id. at 254 n.9.
64
GILENS, supra note 10 and accompanying text; Gilens, Policy Consequences, supra note 30, at 247.
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outcomes for those who are not wealthy. When the gap in
preferences between rich and poor increases from less than five
percentage points to more than ten percentage points, the poor
essentially lose all of their influence over policy, whereas the
wealthy retain their influence.65 One might think this is just
majoritarianism at work: the poor, after all, could be outvoted
by the wealthy and middle class. But the same effect operates
for those at the fiftieth income percentile and those at the seventieth income percentile.66 Gilens even tested coalitions in
which the preferences of the poor and middle class are aligned
against those of the wealthy, and he still found that policy was
unresponsive to the lower-income groups’ combined power.67
Gilens’s findings operate across all areas of policy: foreign policy,68 economic and tax policy, religious/values issues, and
social welfare policy, though the effects vary somewhat by
area.69 Interestingly, the data looks the same even when taking education into account. As the level of education goes up,
so too does policy responsiveness, but increases in income far
outstrip the gains from education. Someone at the ninetieth
percentile in income and tenth percentile in education has
about the same influence as someone at the ninetieth percentile for both income and education; but a person at the ninetieth percentile in education and tenth percentile in income has
about half as much policy influence.70
Policy responsiveness to the general public also changes
based on the proximity of presidential elections, but elections
do not fully counteract the influence of economic elites. During
presidential election years, policies are more consistent with
the views of all Americans than in years without a presidential
election—but they are still the most responsive to the views of
65
GILENS, supra note 10, at 79–81; Gilens, Policy Consequences, supra note
30, at 250–52.
66
GILENS, supra note 10, at 79–81; Gilens, Policy Consequences, supra note
30, at 250–53.
67
See GILENS, supra note 10, at 83–84.
68
Scholars have researched foreign policy issues in detail and found similar
effects. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & MARSHALL M. BOUTON, THE FOREIGN POLICY DISCONNECT: WHAT AMERICANS WANT FROM OUR LEADERS BUT DON’T GET 170–73, 219–20
(2006); Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign
Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 114–17 (2005). For evidence of a divergence
between leaders and ordinary Americans in foreign policy preferences, see generally Benjamin I. Page & Jason Barabas, Foreign Policy Gaps Between Citizens and
Leaders, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 339 (2000).
69
See Gilens, Policy Consequences, supra note 30, at 256–73; supra note 10
and accompanying text.
70
See GILENS, supra note 10, at 93–95.
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the affluent.71 In midterm election years, however, there is no
such effect.72 While this finding might be somewhat promising,
suggesting that elections are a check on the influence of the
wealthy, policies that are adopted during presidential election
years are more likely to be cut over time than those adopted
during years without a presidential election.73 In other words,
policies most likely to align with the preferences of non-affluent
voters are first on the chopping block when non-affluent voters
lose the influence that comes from an imminent presidential
election.
Scholars have suggested that male representatives’ views
on women’s issues are shaped by whether they have daughters, and recent work in political science has now tested
whether economic class shapes legislators’ views.74 In the
most extensive study on the topic, Nicholas Carnes concludes
that “[o]n the important economic issues of the day, members
of Congress routinely vote with class.”75 Controlling for party,
age, race, gender, religion, constituent demographics, ideology,
donor base, and margins of victory, Carnes shows that class is
significant—making a bigger difference than even race, income
differences in constituents, gender, and union membership
among constituents.76 Only partisan affiliation is more significant. Had Congress truly been representative of the class
background of the people, Carnes finds, major economic legislation passed between 1999 and 2008 would have failed, including the 2001 Bush tax cuts, laws limiting liability for
business from the Y2K problem, and the Gulf of Mexico oil
drilling legislation.77
Carnes’s data raise the possibility that partisanship might
mitigate class-bias. It is a reasonable hypothesis that American politics features two parties, one that aligns itself with the
wealthy and one with the middle class. Political scientists have
71

Id. at 163.
Id. at 171–72.
73
See id. at 173–74, 196 n.24 (describing findings based on data from Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, After Enactment: The Lives
and Deaths of Federal Programs, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (2010)).
74
See Ebonya L. Washington, Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect
Their Legislator Fathers’ Voting on Women’s Issues, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 311,
319–28 (2008) (finding that legislators with daughters have a greater propensity
to vote to support women’s rights, particularly reproductive rights). The same
effect has been found with smokers and pro-tobacco voting records. See BARRY C.
BURDEN, PERSONAL ROOTS OF REPRESENTATION 62–64 (2007).
75
CARNES, supra note 37, at 27. For a discussion of Carnes’s methodology,
see id. at 17–21.
76
Id. at 36–38.
77
Id. at 113–20.
72
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considered the relationship between wealth and party, and
while there is some truth to this hypothesis, it is incomplete. In
their study of the top 1%, Page, Bartels, and Seawright found
that wealth had an effect on preferences independent of party
and that wealthy Democrats were “more conservative than
Democrats in the general population.”78 When it comes to policy responsiveness, political scientists have found that both
parties are more responsive to the wealthy than to ordinary
Americans, but Republicans are even more responsive to the
affluent than are Democrats.79 In fact, a shift in affluent preferences can completely neutralize the effects of partisanship.80
Surprisingly, sometimes partisan power is linked to a reduction in responsiveness to all groups. Gilens finds that the
larger the Senate seat majority for a party, the lower the link
between policy preferences and policy outcomes of constituents
(though the affluent still benefit more than middle income people).81 When either party controls during unified government,
responsiveness plummets.82 It appears that when parties gain
complete control, they unmoor themselves from constituent
preferences and increasingly work to advance the party’s own
goals. This does not mean that divided government corrects for
the effects of wealth. Party polarization combined with gridlock
from divided government is more responsive to the general
public, but only at the cost of blocking a substantial amount of
policy change because only policies that are uncontroversial
can run the legislative gauntlet.83 Moreover, when partisan
gridlock combines with divergent preferences, the ninetieth income percentile still has the most influence over outcomes.84
“[U]nder most circumstances,” Martin Gilens concludes,
“the preferences of the vast majority of Americans appear to
have essentially no impact on which policies the government
does or doesn’t adopt.”85 Rather, “for Americans below the top
of the income distribution, any association between prefer78

Page, Bartels & Seawright, supra note 7, at 66.
See BARTELS supra note 61, at 268–69 (“Republican senators were about
twice as responsive as Democrats to the views of high-income constituents.”);
GILENS, supra note 10, at 181 (“[T]he preference/policy link under maximum
Republican control is about twice as strong as under maximum Democratic
control.”).
80
See BARTELS supra note 61, at 264.
81
See GILENS, supra note 10, at 215–17.
82
See id. at 229.
83
See id. at 194, 211.
84
Id. at 212–13.
85
Id. at 1.
79
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ences and policy outcomes is likely to reflect the extent to
which their preferences coincide with those of the affluent.”86
C. Theories of American Politics
What does all this data mean for how we envision American
politics? Traditionally, political science has been divided into
four basic theories, two focused on individuals and two on
interest groups.87 Majoritarian Electoral Democracy focuses
on the will of average citizens, including median voter theory
and majoritarian democratic theorists.88 Economic Elite Domination suggests that people with high wealth (or on some theories, high socioeconomic status89) are the primary driver of
American public policy.90 Majoritarian Pluralism takes the optimistic view of interest group activity, suggesting that the
“wants or needs of the average citizen tend to be reasonably
well served by the outcomes of interest-group struggle”91 in
part because there are many interest groups, they can enter
and exit politics, and the winners of this interest group struggle
are not always the same. Finally, Biased Pluralism takes the
pessimistic view of interest group politics, arguing that politics
is dominated by business and elite economic interest groups.92
In an important article, Gilens and Page tested these four
theories to see how well they explain policy outcomes across a
twenty-year period.93 Unlike most previous work, which compares a single theory to policy outcomes, Gilens and Page use a
new dataset and multivariate analysis to test the theories
against each other. Their conclusion: “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while
mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or
no independent influence.”94
In particular, the chances of policy change are “nearly the
same . . . whether a tiny minority or a large majority of average
citizens favor a proposed policy change.”95 Indeed, Gilens and
86

Id. at 83.
Gilens & Page, supra note 8, at 564.
88
See id. at 565–66.
89
See C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 11–15 (1956) (describing these individuals as “people of the higher circles”).
90
Gilens & Page, supra note 8, at 566.
91
Id. at 567. For the classics from a majoritarian pluralist perspective, see
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
92
See Gilens & Page, supra note 8, at 567–68.
93
The dataset covered from 1981–2002. Id. at 568.
94
Id. at 565.
95
Id. at 572.
87
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Page note that their findings cannot test the influence of different levels of economic elites because they test wealth only at
the ninetieth income percentile, rather than all the way to the
ninety-ninth percentile.96 With respect to interest groups, they
find that while business and non-business groups have about
the same influence on a group for group basis, business groups
have “numerical dominance and relative cohesion.”97 Their
power is largely a function of their numerical dominance.98
While many in political science and law view majoritarian
electoral democracy or majoritarian pluralism as their archetypical image of American politics,99 the data suggest that that
economic elites—individuals and business interest groups—
dominate. Elites’ preferences diverge from those of the average
American (and the majority of Americans), they participate at
much greater rates in all aspects of politics, and their preferences—not those of average Americans—have an impact on
policy change.
To be sure, this does not mean that the wealthy always get
their preferences enacted into law. Given the barriers to making policy, there is a status quo bias in seeking policy
change,100 and it is often the case that the wealthy and business interest groups may seek to preserve the status quo by
blocking reform rather than to advance policy change.101 But
the fundamental reality of our system is that it is not best
characterized by majority rule but rather by the dominance of
economic elites.
II
THE PUZZLING ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC POWER IN
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Despite the empirical evidence, contemporary debates in
constitutional theory have largely been silent as to the role of
economic power. This absence is at once puzzling and problematic. Without accounting for the influence of economic
elites over policymaking, leading constitutional theories in
some cases are incomplete, and in other cases, fail to achieve
their stated goals. Economic power is relevant to constitutional
theory because constitutional theory inevitably relies on nor96
97
98
99
100
101

See id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
See id.
For a discussion of the legal literature, see infra Part III.
See GILENS, supra note 10, at 73–74.
See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 39, at 7; GILENS, supra note 10, at 133.
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mative assumptions to guide design. My aim here is not to
adopt or advocate for a normative theory and then argue that
the empirical evidence of elite economic domination runs
counter to that theory. Rather, my argument is that elite economic domination is a problem for a variety of constitutional
theories on their own terms. In other words, the normative and
positive foundations of many constitutional theories are inconsistent with a regime in which economic elites in fact dominate
politics.
This Part opens by noting how economic power disparities
pose a significant problem for many (but not all) of the prominent normative theories that undergird constitutional structure. It then turns to the Madisonian theory of the
Constitution. Madisonian theory claims to prevent the dominance of factions. But whether by design or inadvertence, it is
inadequately attentive to the possible ways in which minority
factions—particularly economic elites—can capture government power. Finally, this Part considers contemporary debates
in constitutional theory: interest group politics, the countermajoritarian difficulty and the undemocratic constitutional structure, political party and partisan theories, and popular
constitutionalism. These theories, which often have both explanatory and aspirational goals, are likewise inattentive to the
possibility of political dominance by economic elites. But without attention to the role economic power plays in modern politics, these theories are either incomplete or fail on their own
terms.
A. The Relevance of Economic Power for Constitutional
Theory
Why is economic power relevant to debates in constitutional theory? Constitutional theory is inevitably based on
some set of normative assumptions, a theory about how the
constitutional structure should be designed. For many—but
certainly not all—of these theories, the reality of elite economic
domination in American politics is problematic. To be successful, these theories (and any debate or proposal rooted in them)
must at least grapple with the problem of elite economic domination. My purpose here is not to adopt any one of these normative theories as my baseline. Rather, it is to point out that
each of these theories suffers from limitations and flaws because it ignores the reality of economic power.
Consider a few of the leading normative theories undergirding American constitutional design. Republicanism has a
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number of adherents, with variations along dialogic,102 pluralist,103 Aristotelian and communitarian,104 and non-domination105 lines. Despite these variations, the broad theory,
derived from seventeenth and eighteenth century political
thought,106 focuses on representatives engaging in reasoning
about the common good. Republican leaders are meant to be
“disinterested,” a term that in republican theory denotes that
they are “free of interested ties and paid by no masters.”107 On
this theory, legislators who act to serve the economic elites (or
to serve their own elite economic interests) corrupt republican
government.108 Republicans must therefore be deeply concerned about the problem of economic elites dominating government, particularly when it serves interests that diverge from
the public good.
Economic domination is also a problem for majoritarian,
democratic, and optimistic pluralist theories. If the aspiration
for the constitutional system is that it reflects popular will,
either by aligning with majority preferences as some populist
theories suggest,109 or by means of equal political participation
as some democratic theories argue,110 then a system that only
reflects the preferences of a limited number of economic elites
is obviously problematic. If a small minority’s preferences
dominate policy outcomes, then the structure is hardly
majoritarian or democratic under these theories. Optimistic
pluralist theories assume that interest group pluralism leads
not to consistent dominance of one group, but rather to the
102
See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1524–32 (1988).
For the foundational statement of Michelman’s views on Republicanism, see generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
103
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 32–35 (1985).
104
See, e.g., LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 5–7 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984)
(broadly describing the communitarian critique of rights-based liberalism).
105
See PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS 69–74 (2012) (describing the concept of “non-domination” and suggesting that it bolsters the legitimacy of republican governance); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM 65–73, 92–97 (1997).
106
See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975) (describing
the development of republicanism in the history of political thought); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 46–90 (1969) (tracing the development of American republicanism).
107
GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS 16 (2006).
108
See Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the
Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 77–81, 103–09 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
109
See generally RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE 93–115 (1994)
(advocating a populist approach to constitutionalism).
110
The literature on democratic theory is huge. But for the most relevant,
recent legal contribution, see LEVINSON, supra note 21, at 50–62.
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public good either via rotating victors or deliberative compromise.111 Here too, the difficulties of elite dominance are evident: if one small faction consistently dominates, then the
constitutional system looks more like oligarchy than pluralism.
Theories of representation fare little better. Political theorists have offered a variety of ways to understand representation,112 but since the goal here is not an extended normative
defense of any particular theory, just consider the two major
theories of representation in Hanna Pitkin’s influential typology.113 First, representation can mean “standing for” the one
who is represented, such that the representatives describe or
resemble those who are represented.114 Thus, John Adams
wrote in 1776 that the legislature “should be an exact portrait,
in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel,
reason, and act like them.”115 James Wilson had a similar view
during the Constitutional Convention, reportedly saying that
the “Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the
whole Society.”116 The reality of elite economic rule is selfevidently a problem for those who support a descriptive theory
of representation. When the representatives are disproportionately taken from the economic elites, they simply cannot be
said to resemble those they represent in the manner that this
approach suggests.
111
See DAHL, supra note 46, at 145–46; TRUMAN, supra 46, at 503–16. In the
legal literature, see generally Sunstein, supra note 103, for a discussion of both
interest group theory and republicanism.
112
For the most influential account, see generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60–143 (1967) (distinguishing between representation
as “standing for” and “acting for”). For other typologies, see Philip Pettit, Varieties
of Public Representation, in POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 61, 65 (Ian Shapiro et al.
eds., 2009) (arguing that representation can be indicative, directed, and interpretive); MóNICA BRITO VIEIRA & DAVID RUNCIMAN, REPRESENTATION, at x (2008) (defining
three types of representation: where representatives are told what to do, decide
what to do, or copy what to do); Quentin Skinner, Hobbes on Representation, 13
EUR. J. PHIL. 155, 156–57, 168–69, 172–74 (2005) (classifying representation as
juridical, theatrical, and pictorial).
113
Pitkin creates subcategories within her two categories. Standing for representation can be descriptive or symbolic; acting for representation can be independent or mandated. Within these, she also discusses a range of hypothetical
situations and nuances. For simplicity, my focus here is only on the ideal types.
Some nuance is lost, but the underlying point becomes clear without an extended
philosophical discussion of representation. See PITKIN, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
114
PITKIN, supra note 112, at 60–61.
115
John Adams, Letter to John Penn, Jan. 1776, in IV THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 203, 205 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
116
James Wilson, Comments on June 6, 1787, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 74 (Adrienne Koch ed.,
1984).
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Representation can also mean “acting for” the represented.117 There are many versions of this approach, and they
lie on a spectrum from being a trustee that makes independent
decisions to being a transmission belt for the represented person’s preferences.118 In addition “acting for” can range from
acting for a person’s broad, “unattached” interests to her narrow, specific interests.119 In general, elite economic power is
less of a problem for the “acting for” theory than the “standing
for” theory. To the extent representatives are supposed to be
closely linked to the people—that is, that they are less independent in their choices and have a narrow view of the people’s
interests—we would need evidence that elites are following the
people’s directives to show that elite rule is not problematic.
On the other hand, to the extent that one believes representatives have independence from the people (for example, on a
Burkean theory, representatives should act in the people’s
broad interests but not necessarily according to their preferences120), we would need evidence that the representatives’
substantive actions are in fact in the interest of the people, not
simply in their own interests. Given that the data show preference divergences between the wealthy and everyone else, particularly on economic issues that seem to benefit the wealthy or
harm everyone else, adherents to Burkean approaches would
need to rebut the hypothesis that economic elites are simply
serving their own interests. If they cannot, then they must
justify why representatives should be able to serve their own
interests.
To be sure, for some normative theories, elite economic
domination is simply not a problem. Libertarians and classical
liberals might be less concerned because their focus is on restricting government action in favor of private ordering.121
Other theorists might affirmatively prefer a constitutional system in which economic elites dominate.122 Still other theorists
recognize that constitutional design has a variety of goals,
there are tradeoffs between these goals, and second-best solu117

PITKIN, supra note 112, at 112–43.
See id. at 144–50.
119
See id. at 156–67.
120
Edmund Burke, Speech at Mr. Burke’s Arrival in Bristol, in THE PORTABLE
EDMUND BURKE 155, 156 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999).
121
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
122
As an example, see generally JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950) (arguing for elite-rule with only formal democratic
selection mechanisms).
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tions are inevitable.123 While these latter theorists often do not
explicitly discuss economic power,124 economic domination
might fit comfortably within their frameworks.
One other note: depending on one’s underlying theory, the
remedy for addressing the disproportionate power of economic
elites might differ. Adherents to “standing for” representation
will seek different remedies from those who support “acting for”
representation. Those who support a strong form of majoritarianism will pursue a different course than republicans. Part IV
explores the variety of solutions that adherents to any of these
theories might consider.
B. Economic Power and the Madisonian Design
Constitutional law is traditionally divided into structure
and rights, separating “the institutional framework of democratic government” from “limits on what that government is
permitted to do.”125 While much of the discussion about economic inequality focuses on the rights side of the equation,126
outside of constitutional theory related to campaign finance
reform, there is comparatively less attention to the structural
side. This emphasis misses one of the core features of American constitutional theory: that structure can protect rights.127
Madison and the Framers believed that constitutional rights
would be ineffective because they would fail to prevent the
exercise of government power.128 As a result, they attempted to
design the government in a manner that would protect rights
through the political process.129
While some scholars have argued that the Framers of the
Constitution had majoritarian commitments,130 it is hard to
123
See ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 3–19 (2014); ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–13 (2011).
124
But see Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673,
678–83 (2015) (recognizing the power of private actors).
125
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1288, 1293
(2012).
126
For a discussion of constitutionalizing socioeconomic or welfare rights, see
infra notes 371–73 and accompanying text.
127
See Levinson, supra note 125, at 1293.
128
See id. at 1293–95.
129
See id.
130
See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 10–24 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1043, 1047–60 (1988); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 481–86 (1994).
For critiques of these scholars’ views, see Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact
/ Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional
Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 778–92 (1992) (criticizing Ackerman); Henry Paul
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argue that the founding generation was truly populist or democratic in the contemporary sense. The Framers created a variety of structural elements that would prevent ordinary people
from exercising control over government, and they were fearful
of the “excess of democracy.”131 Indeed, the accomplishment of
Federalist 10 is a political theory that elevates to power “a
chosen body of citizens.”132 The point here is not to take sides
in the debate over how “democratic” or “elitist” the Founders
were. Regardless of how the historical evidence comes out, the
Madisonian structure133—the well-accepted modern understanding of how the Constitution was supposed to work—inadequately addresses the role that powerful economic minorities
might play in society and how their power would intersect with
the constitutional structure.
Consider Madison’s treatment of factions. With respect to
majority factions, Madison famously argued in Federalist 10
that in an enlarged republic, there would be a multiplicity of
interests, which should protect against majority tyranny.
Speaking directly to questions of property and economic power,
he identified debtors and creditors’ interests but also noted
that “[a] landed interest, a manufacturing interest a mercantile
interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow
up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.”134 He
offered the same theory in Federalist 51: “In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of
interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a
majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any
other principles than those of justice and the general
good . . . .”135
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 157–76 (1996) (criticizing Amar).
131
See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 48 (Elbridge
Gerry) (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
132
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
133
For recent scholarship discussing and critiquing the Madisonian structure, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 438–47 (2012); Daryl J. Levinson, EmpireBuilding Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 950–64 (2005);
Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 716–33 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment and Politics]; Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2347–67; Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 883–94 (2007).
134
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
135
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 325 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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Madison’s explanation for why these various interests
would prevent majority tyranny seems to have been based on
both structural and political economy factors. As a structural
matter, Madison argued in Federalist 10 that in a large society
there will be a numerically greater number of interests than in
a small society, which means that it will be harder for those
interests to coalesce into a majority and that even if they do
coalesce into a majority, harder for that majority to dominate
politics on a repeat basis.136 As a result, self-interested factions would cancel each other out, enabling the rise of leaders
who were committed to the wider public interest.137 Historians
have also argued that Madison’s politics were intertwined with
his economic views: that the emerging republic featured comparative economic equality vis-à-vis European nations.
Madison (and even more prominently, Jefferson) assumed that
the new republic would be composed largely of hard-working
yeoman farmers, leading to relative equality within the population.138 In contrast to the Old World, the widespread availability of land allowed for the growth and expansion of an agrarian
republic, without the vices that came with commercial development.139 The political economy of the late eighteenth century
thus formed the backdrop for Madison’s “variety of interests”
theory.
The trouble with the “variety of interests” theory, however,
is that it does not align with the reality of our current political
system. Federalist 10 is often heralded as presaging the
majoritarian interest group pluralism theories of the 1950s,140
but the empirical evidence suggests that those theories simply
do not describe political outcomes. It turns out that business
and industry interest groups are not only more involved in
politics but also that their preferences better explain outcomes
than the views of other interest groups. Political scientists
have also shown that when compared to elite economic domination and biased pluralism, the “majoritarian pluralism” theory of American politics has no explanatory power over political
136

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 77–84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
137
See id.; Book Note, The Relevance and Irrelevance of the Founders, 120
HARV. L. REV. 619, 624–25 (2006) (summarizing Madison’s argument about
factions).
138
See DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC 13–15 (1980).
139
See id.
140
See STEPHEN MILLER, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 48 (1983)
(discussing the influence of Federalist 10 on David Truman, a leading political
scientist associated with 1950s interest group theory).
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outcomes.141 The evidence suggests that the same groups do
in fact consistently dominate politics.
More pertinently, Madison also addressed the issue of minority faction. Here, his response is even more severely undertheorized. Madison dispatches with the problem of minority
factions in a single sentence: “relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
views by regular vote.”142 While this answer is intuitive, it is at
best woefully incomplete and at worst empirically false. In
cases of “democracy by coincidence,” majority preferences are
enacted (or not enacted as the case may be) into law. But when
preferences diverge between the affluent and everyone else, the
preferences of the majority of Americans are insignificant in
explaining policy outcomes—and the preferences of a wealthy
minority remain just as robust as when they align with the
majority. If policy is responsive to the affluent minority’s preferences, even when the majority of Americans disagrees with
the policy, then Madison’s “republican principle” is hardly a
safeguard against a minority faction’s “sinister views.”
The minority power problem is compounded by the composition of elected officials. In Federalist 57, Madison responded
to charges that the House of Representatives would be made up
of elites, not from the “mass of the people.”143 He responded by
noting that voters would be drawn from “the great body of the
people,” and “[n]ot the rich, more than the poor; not the
learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and
unpropitious fortune.”144 Similarly, candidates would emerge
from the whole population, as “[n]o qualification of wealth, of
birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to
fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.”145 Once in office, members of Congress would be kept
faithful to the people because of “[d]uty, gratitude, interest,
141

See supra text accompanying notes 87–100.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
143
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). In Federalist 39, Madison makes a similar comment: “It is essential to [a
republican] government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not
from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of
tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers,
might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
144
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
145
Id.
142
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ambition itself,” and he noted the special importance of frequent elections in keeping them faithful.146
In reality, Madison’s point about the disciplining effect of
elections is the only element borne out by the data. Not only
has the American experience with access to the ballot and candidacy been fiercely contested and hardly universal,147 but
even assuming formal equality in access to voting and candidacy, the functional reality is that there are significant disparities in who votes, and beyond that, who participates in
politics—and these disparities all favor the wealthy.148 In particular, the poorest Americans are least likely to use their political voice through the ballot.149 As for the officeholders
selected, as Nicholas Carnes has shown, almost no legislators
at the city, state, or federal level come from blue-collar backgrounds themselves, and only a relatively small percentage
come from blue-collar families.150 Madison may have been
right as a matter of formal accessibility, but functionally, the
composition of elected representatives is skewed in an affluent
direction. The best that can be said for Madison’s argument is
that political scientists show that there are disciplining effects
to elections that reduce slightly the power of the affluent over
policy positions during elections years; but even then, the effects are only significant in presidential election years and the
policies adopted during those years are the most likely to be
rolled back in subsequent years.151
Madison’s undertheorized approach to minority faction
also extends one step further: to indirect forms of minority
capture. Madison believed first-order protection of rights
would merely be “parchment” barriers because those rights
could be overturned through the political process.152 Hence,
he focused on second-order structural protections.153 But
Madison does not account for private interests seeking broader
146

Id. at 353.
See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2000) (tracing the
evolution of the right to vote throughout American history and highlighting the
struggle in reaching universal suffrage).
148
See supra subpart I.A.
149
See Daniel Weeks, Democracy in Poverty: A View from Below 9–11 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 10, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264877 [https://perma.cc/KYM75N2S].
150
See supra text accompanying note 56.
151
See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
152
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
153
See generally Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 133 (outlining
this argument).
147
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societal capture. In Federalist 10, Madison notes that one option for preventing tyranny is to create a society with homogenous views, but he dismisses this idea as “impracticable” and
“unwise.”154 While it might be “unwise” for society, it is a powerful strategy for an economically advantaged minority that
seeks a more robust popular foundation for its policies. By
spreading its ideology through well-funded academic research,
think tanks, media outlets, and organizing structures, a minority can expand its power in the political process by shaping the
views of the most influential members of society.155 This type
of capture—sometimes called cognitive, epistemic, or cultural
capture156—is not fanciful. Starting in the 1970s, conservatives built a well-funded conservative legal and political infrastructure to advance their ideological goals.157 In the early
2000s, progressives realized they were decades behind in this
Gramscian race for ideological hegemony and their financiers
attempted to create a countervailing progressive political infrastructure.158 Of course, this kind of capture is complex to
evaluate. On the one hand, if the people genuinely adopt an
ideology, the influence of economic power in that decision
might be less concerning. On the other, it might be more pernicious if there is not a fierce contest of ideas leading to the
people adopting those views.
In sum, the Madisonian design largely fails to grapple sufficiently with the possibility that economic elites will end up
dominating American politics. Whether this was intentional
because Madison was hoping for elite rule or inadvertent because he could not imagine broad disparities of wealth is
largely irrelevant if the reality of elite economic domination is
normatively troubling. Constitutional theory needs an answer
to the inadequacies of the Madisonian structure.

154

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
For a political science theory that predicts precisely this practice, see FERGUSON, supra note 27, at 35–37 (noting that investment theory predicts (unlike
median voter theory) that efforts will be made to move the public’s views toward
the views of investors, rather than the other way around).
156
See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 78–79 (Daniel
Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014); see also David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 31, 32 (2013).
157
See MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 7–10
(2013); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 2–3 (2008).
158
MATT BAI, THE ARGUMENT: BILLIONAIRES, BLOGGERS, AND THE BATTLE TO REMAKE
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 6–21 (2007).
155
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C. Contemporary Constitutional Theory
Madison’s lack of engagement on the issue of economic
power can be explained away by elitism or myopia, but what is
more puzzling is that contemporary constitutional theory has
not been seriously engaged with the problem of economic
power. In an effort to make constitutional theory more realistic, theorists have explored the role of interest group politics
and political parties in our political and constitutional system.
Theorists have also spent considerable energy on more normative questions tied to majority and minority power, in particular
focusing on the countermajoritarian difficulty and the undemocratic structures outlined in the Constitution. Yet these prominent debates, debates that have occupied the field for decades,
either are incomplete, require qualification, or fail on their own
terms because they do not engage with the reality of elite economic domination in American politics.
1. Interest Groups and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
For much of the mid to late twentieth century, constitutional theorists focused on the “countermajoritarian difficulty,”
that unelected judges strike down legislation supported by
democratic majorities.159 The standard response to this problem was that countermajoritarian actions can be a “virtue” because the Court protects minority rights from oppressive
majorities.160 Other scholars criticized the countermajoritarian obsession as an “academic illusion.”161 In addition to
contextualizing the debate over the countermajoritarian problem in the particular historical circumstances of the Warren
Court,162 these revisionists criticized countermajoritarian theorists for taking an overly simplistic and unrealistic view of
159
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five,
112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (“For decades, legal academics have struggled with
the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’: the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.”); see also Amar, supra note 130, at 495
(discussing preoccupation with the countermajoritarian difficulty); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1998) (“Contemporary constitutional law is preoccupied with the antidemocratic nature of judicial
review.”).
160
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 492 (1997).
161
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2364–65.
162
See Friedman, supra note 159, at 159.
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American government.163 First, they argued that judicial review is not countermajoritarian because judicial actions are
restrained by the bounds of public opinion and the political
branches.164 Second, they held that enacted legislation is not
necessarily “majoritarian.”
The idea that legislation was not majoritarian focused
largely on the role of interest groups in the legislative process.
In response to the rise of public choice theory in economics and
political science in the 1970s and 1980s,165 legal scholars increasingly applied public choice theory to public law.166 On
this approach, legislators do not necessarily act in the public
interest or in accordance with majority preferences but rather
respond to organized interest group pressure. Because diffuse
groups of people face collective action and free rider problems,
it is harder for them to organize and participate in politics than
it is for specific interest groups. Interest groups pursue a number of pathways for influence in Congress, ranging from campaign contributions to lobbying efforts, and legislators respond
to their efforts.
The theory led to a burst of legal scholarship on how judicial review could address the problem of interest group power.
Some scholars argued that because legislative decisionmaking
is skewed in favor of interest groups, courts should review legislation with heightened scrutiny to prevent legislation driven
by interest group power.167 Others focused on antitrust princi163
Id. at 165; Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881, 1921 (1991) (“Of course, the democratic
objection to judicial review has never really depended on a candid assessment of
the actual practices of democracy.”). There are other arguments. For example,
how we define the relevant majority when a state law is at issue will shape
whether a decision is majoritarian or not, Friedman, supra note 159, at 173–74.
In addition, courts often invalidate administrative actions and the actions of police officials, neither of which are self-evidently “majoritarian.” See id. at 175.
164
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 3–7 (2004); see also
Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 775–76 (1991) [hereinafter Klarman, Puzzling Resistance]; Levinson &
Pildes, supra note 22, at 2365 nn.237 & 239.
165
See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 1–9
(1974); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983); George J. Stigler, Free Riders and
Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulations, 5 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 359, 359–65 (1974); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
166
See infra notes 179–184 and accompanying text.
167
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 265–303 (1980); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43,
46–47, 78, 80–81 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705–17 (1984); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitu-

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN602.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 35

19-SEP-16

PUZZLING ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC POWER

16:09

1479

ples to prevent interest group capture.168 Still others argued
that the same goals could be accomplished if judges engaged in
narrower statutory interpretation when interest group benefits
were at stake.169 The common thread was that interest groups
had “captured” the legislature and that judicial review can
undo the ill-effects of interest group skewed-legislation. Judicial review could serve as a majoritarian check on a countermajoritarian legislative process.170
The problem with these proposals was highlighted in an
important and persuasive article in which Professor Einer
Elhauge argues against heightened judicial review as a response to interest group theory.171 Elhauge’s primary argument is that it is impossible to condemn interest group
influence as “disproportionate” without an uncontroversial
normative baseline from which to evaluate the “appropriate”
degree of influence for an interest group.172 Such considerations turn on the underlying substantive arguments about the
moral, policy, or political issues at stake, not on the fact of
interest group influence itself. Thus, “condemning the political
process because of interest group influence is indistinguishable from condemning the political process for producing outcomes the condemner dislikes on independent normative
grounds. The condemnation of the political process draws any
tional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849,
874–75 (1980); Sunstein, supra note 103, 56–57; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1699–1700 (1984).
168
See William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process, 61
B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1109–15, 1122–25 (1981); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture
Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 743–44 (1986).
169
Versions include Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 TermForeword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14–18 (1984);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 279, 298–99, 303–09,
324–25 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228 n.29, 252 (1986);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 471, 486 (1989).
170
Klarman, supra note 160, at 495–97.
171
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
172
Id. at 48. Elhauge also had other arguments, but this is the central one—
and one echoed in the literature. See, e.g., Klarman, Puzzling Resistance, supra
note 164, at 768–69 (noting that theories of constitutional adjudication need to be
“susceptible to ‘objective’ implementation . . . [so] judges of different political
predisposition to generally derive consistent results”). For a statement of the
argument prior to Elhauge, in the context of political process theory, see Laurence
H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1072–76 (1980) (describing the problem of deciding which groups
should win in the legislative process).
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persuasiveness it has from the underlying normative theory
rather than from interest group theory.”173 In other words,
whether a minority has too much influence in the political process requires some preexisting view about which groups should
win.174 He also argued that even if one adopted a “majoritarian
baseline,” that baseline would not account for intensity of preferences, which, independently of organizational advantage,
might be a desirable reason for minority interest groups to
succeed in the policy process.175
The trouble with the debate over interest groups—including with Elhauge’s powerful argument—is that it does not reflect the empirical reality of American politics. First, the
original interest group theories were not empirical, and
Elhauge himself explicitly stayed away from entering into a
debate on empirical evidence as to what factors influenced political decisionmaking.176 While the earlier generation of constitutional scholars recognized that legislation might not be
majoritarian, they did not have the benefit of data describing
exactly how legislation diverges from majority preferences.177
Indeed, the absence of actual evidence on public preferences
and policy outcomes led Barry Friedman to end his magisterial
work on the countermajoritarian difficulty with a call for
greater empiricism.178 Now we have considerable empirical evidence about political influence and outcomes.
Second, because of the lack of empirical evidence, the argument that legislation is not majoritarian traditionally focused on abstract versions of public choice theory, such as the
Arrow Theorem,179 or on the collective action problems inherent in organizing interest groups.180 Scholars in this area, as a
result, not only focused more on interest group formation (and
173

Elhauge, supra note 171, at 49.
Id. at 51 n.86; Tribe, supra note 172, at 1072–76 (criticizing process theory
on these grounds).
175
Elhauge, supra note 171, at 50, 58–59, 64.
176
Id. at 43–44.
177
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 78–79 (describing nonmajoritarian factors that influence the legislative process, including lack of overlap between voting population and total population, interest group influence,
personal preferences of elected officials, logrolling, and other factors). Only recently have legal scholars started applying that data to legal doctrines on group
power. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessnes, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527 (2015) (assessing group power for purposes of the equal
protection doctrine).
178
See Friedman, supra note 159, at 257.
179
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 80; Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 639–42 (1993).
180
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 169, at 9–10.
174
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tended to assume influence over the policy process) but also
assumed that there would not be consistent winners and losers
in political decisionmaking, beyond those suggested by neutral
organizational factors.181 Elhauge’s critique, in turn, relied
largely on the variety of possible (and contested) normative
baselines.182 But here too, the political science evidence weakens the argument: the majoritarian pluralism theory of American politics simply does not have empirical support in
explaining policy outcomes.
Political scientists have now shown that the political process is best explained by theories of elite economic domination,
and this data provides a new way of understanding the scope of
the countermajoritarian difficulty.183 In cases of “democracy
by coincidence,” the legislative process leads to majoritarian
outcomes. Judicial review in these situations can be supported
or criticized based on standard arguments about countermajoritarian judicial overreach versus minority protection. But
when preferences between the wealthy and everyone else diverge, the data shows that the preferences of the majority are
insignificant to the point of being irrelevant. Because the legislative process results in countermajoritarian outcomes, there is
an opportunity for judicial review to take on a majoritarian
flavor. The empirical research establishes how exactly the legislative process is systematically countermajoritarian.184
Importantly, with this new data, the normative baseline
argument is far less problematic. The political science data
allow us to craft an empirical baseline, rather than relying on a
181
Indeed, for good reason. There was not data on the actual winners and
losers from the political process.
182
Elhauge, supra note 171, at 58–59 (citing wealth maximization, utility
maximization, distributive justice as different options). It is also important to note
that the empirical evidence suggests that Elhauge’s argument about the strength
of preferences does not justify a non-majoritarian position. Gilens argues that
when Americans express policy preferences, high-income Americans do not feel
more strongly about those expressed preferences. GILENS, supra note 10, at 91.
For example, the 2004 American National Election Study followed each policy
question with an inquiry into the importance of the policy issue to the respondent.
Though the strength of respondents’ feelings differed across issues, on average
“low-, middle-, and high-income respondents expressed nearly identical levels of
importance.” Id. Furthermore, a subset of Gilens’s data measured both direction
and strength of preference. This data demonstrates “no difference across income
levels in the propensity of respondents to say they ‘strongly’ as opposed to ‘somewhat’ favor or oppose a given policy.” Id.
183
See Friedman, supra note 159, at 159 (arguing that the problem was only
relevant in its specific historical context).
184
Cf. Klarman, supra note 160, at 495–97 (arguing that judicial review can be
majoritarian when there are electoral entrenchment problems akin to selfdealing).
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variety of theoretically possible baselines. The question is thus
whether the current empirical baseline is normatively preferable to a reformed system that involves heightened judicial scrutiny directed against the dominance of economic elites.
Elhauge’s conclusion—that the “general judgment that the political process is pervasively distorted by interest group influence is effectively no different than a judgment that the results
of the political process are pervasively undesirable”185—remains essentially correct. But the follow-on question is far less
complex because the political process is consistently skewed in
a single direction. While it is not my goal here to argue for
heightened judicial review, the empirics suggest a possibility
that is more about the direction of review rather than advancing an absolute, normative vision of a “good” legislative process. In light of the evidence, the normative debate is between
those who support the current empirical baseline—political
outcomes that favor the wealthy’s preferences—and those who
oppose it and seek a judicial review remedy to correct for that
power imbalance. Advocates for heightened scrutiny need not
adopt a first-best normative view of the world—only argue that
an anti-elite domination approach is normatively better than
the empirical baseline of today’s status quo. This does not
totally get around Elhauge’s theoretical argument, but it narrows the terms of the debate considerably.
2. The Undemocratic Constitution and Popular
Constitutionalism
One of the most prominent approaches to contemporary
constitutional theory can be characterized as democratic or
populist, including popular constitutionalism and democratic
design theories. This family of theories is united by its desire to
ensure that power and influence of the American people, writ
large, in our constitutional system. Surprisingly, however,
these theories have completely ignored the role that economic
power plays in crafting public policy and constitutional
meaning.
Take Professor Sandy Levinson’s recent and thorough critique of the “undemocratic Constitution.”186 Levinson argues
that it is “increasingly difficult to construct a theory of democratic constitutionalism, applying our own twenty-first-century
norms, that vindicates the Constitution under which we are
185
186

Elhauge, supra note 171, at 63.
LEVINSON, supra note 21.
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governed today.”187 He then argues that a wide variety of constitutional structures are fundamentally undemocratic—gerrymandered districts, bicameralism, the presidential veto, the
allocation of Senators by state rather than population, the electoral college, and life tenure for Supreme Court justices.188
Levinson’s objections are wide-ranging and persuasive.
But the trouble is that even if we were to imagine a constitution
that remedied Levinson’s criticisms, it would still not be “democratic” or “majoritarian” along the lines Levinson desires. Suppose, for example, that a new constitutional convention revised
the current Constitution to either eliminate the Senate (addressing both Levinson’s bicameralism and Senatorial allocation concerns) or to allocate Senators by population
(addressing only the Senate structure issue), and removed the
presidential veto, chose presidents by popular vote, and ended
life tenure for federal judges. This new, more democratic system would look much more like rule by the current House of
Representatives. But given divergent preferences between the
affluent and everyone else, unequal rates of participation, the
elite composition of legislators, and responsiveness to the affluent rather than average Americans, it is not clear why we
should expect this new structure to be genuinely “democratic”
or “majoritarian.” Unless Levinson only means “democratic” to
have the thinnest possible definition, limited effectively to one
person, one vote (and it is not clear from his book), it hardly
seems democratic or majoritarian for a small minority of affluent Americans’ views to drive policy, when those views diverge
from that of the majority of Americans. Yet neither Levinson
nor any of the many scholars and commentators who reviewed
and criticized his book from a range of positions even references the power of economic elites over politics.189 Without
187

Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 28 (gerrymandering), 29–38 (bicameralism), 38–48 (presidential
veto), 49–62 (Senate structure), 81–97 (electoral college), 123–39 (life tenure for
Justices).
189
Levinson’s book was widely reviewed and sparked considerable discussion.
See Constitutional Law Symposium: Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L.
REV. 855 (2007) (including contributions from Mark Kende, Tom Vilsack, Sai
Prakash, Heather Gerken, Donald Horowitz, and Ilya Somin and Neal Devins);
Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Conventions: A Review of Our Undemocratic
Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can
Correct It), 7 CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS 52 (2007); Michael C. Dorf, Book Review: Our
Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We
the People Can Correct It), 122 POL. SCI. Q. 663 (2007); Matthew J. Franck, Books
We Decide Not to Read, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 20, 2006), http://www.nationalreview
.com/node/52064/print [https://perma.cc/W2TW-R7WD]; Ronald Goldfarb,
Books in the Law: Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes
188
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addressing this issue head on, it seems unlikely that Levinson’s reforms will make American government “democratic,” in
the manner he envisions.
As a second example within the “democratic” family of constitutional theory, consider the debates over popular constitutionalism.190 Popular constitutionalists oppose judicial
supremacy (and some even object to judicial review191), in favor
of popular control “over the interpretation and enforcement of
constitutional law.”192 Popular constitutionalism comes in a
variety of forms.193 “Robust” versions focus on the people’s
authority to trump judicial power.194 More “modest” versions
stress the role of non-judicial actors in shaping constitutional
Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It), WASH. LAW. (Feb. 2007); Mark A.
Graber, The Constitution in 2020 edited by Jack M. Balkin and Reva D. Siegel;
Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How
We the People Can Correct It) by Sanford Levinson; A Constitution of Many Minds:
Why the Founding Document Doesn’t Mean What It Meant Before by Cass Sunstein, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 677 (2010); Stephen M. Griffin, Levinson and Constitutional
Reform: Some Notes, 67 MD. L. REV. 14 (2007); Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall
Kelso, Of Cabbages and Kings: A Review of Our Undemocratic Constitution by
Sanford Levinson, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1263 (2008); Barney Frank & Robert C. Post,
Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We
the People Can Correct It), 60 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 31 (2007); Robert Justin
Lipkin, Book Review: Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution
Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It), 17 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 33
(2007), http://www.lawcourts.org/LPBR/reviews/levinson0107.htm [https://
perma.cc/24NC-T9R5]; W. Richard Merriman Jr., Book Review: Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People
Can Correct It), 83 INT’L SOC. SCI. REV. 97 (2008); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy
Uncaged (Feb. 4, 2009), Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 09-04; Cass R.
Sunstein, It Could Be Worse, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 16, 2006), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/64516/it-could-be-worse [https://perma.cc/
WHA7-X7RF]; Kenneth D. Ward, A Turn to Politics: Sanford Levinson’s Our Undemocratic Constitution and Debates in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 29
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 311 (2009).
190
David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 2047, 2048 (2010) (“Few schools of constitutional thought have commanded more attention in recent years . . . .”).
191
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 174–76
(1999).
192
Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV.
959, 959 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, 2004]; see also LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES 30–31 (2004) (tracing popular constitutionalism throughout history);
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 191, at 194 (“The populist constitutionalist believes that the public generally should participate in shaping constitutional law more directly and openly.”).
193
Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1616 (2005) (describing the range of possibilities for what
popular constitutionalism is).
194
See Pozen, supra note 190, at 2061–62 (describing robust popular
constitutionalism).
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norms,195 argue for a dialectical relationship between judicial
authority and popular interpretation,196 or note that judges are
responsive to public opinion.197 Popular constitutionalism has
both descriptive and normative elements.198 Descriptively,
popular constitutionalists argue that popular views have historically and do presently shape constitutional development
(albeit to different degrees at different times).199 Normatively,
they argue that popular constitutionalism is desirable and that
judicial supremacists see “democratic politics as scary and
threatening” and are therefore effectively engaged in “High Federalism redux.”200
Despite its prominence, popular constitutionalism suffers
from definitional ambiguity—particularly around how it would
be implemented.201 Proponents and critics alike recognized
this fact and argued that the agenda for popular constitutionalism was figuring out “what kind of institutions we can construct to make popular constitutionalism work.”202 To this
end, some scholars focused on departmentalism,203 including
legislative constitutionalism204 and presidential popular con195

See id. at 2060–61 (describing modest popular constitutionalism).
See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism,
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004); see also Mark
Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 997
(2006) (discussing dialogic accounts).
197
Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2596, 2599 (2003) (describing “mediated popular constitutionalism” along these
lines).
198
Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism and Political Organization, 18
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013).
199
See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 192 (telling the history of
the ebb and flow of popular constitutionalism); Tushnet, supra note 198, at 1.
200
Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 192, at 1003.
201
See Alexander & Solum, supra note 193, at 1602 (“Kramer’s conception of
popular constitutionalism is deeply ambiguous at best and deeply confused at
worst.”); id. at 1616 (describing the many options for what popular constitutionalism might be); Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25
CONST. COMMENT. 461, 463 (2009) (“It is hard to know how popular constitutionalism would work, since few (if any) of its advocates make any concrete suggestions
about how to implement popular constitutional interpretation.”).
202
Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2006); see also
Alexander & Solum, supra note 193, at 1623 (“The people themselves cannot act
with legal authority in a corporate capacity without institutions.”).
203
See Post & Siegel, supra note 196, at 1031; see also Pozen, supra note 190,
at 2063–64 (connecting departmentalism to popular constitutionalism).
204
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 33 (2003); see also
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 515–22 (2000);
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J.
1943, 1951–52 (2003).
196
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stitutionalism.205 Others have argued that social movements
can dialectically shape constitutional meaning through changing social norms that influence judges or through the selection
of judges with different preferences.206 And still others have
suggested that judicial elections at the state level are the most
obvious and self-evident instantiation of popular
constitutionalism.207
As much ink as has been spilled debating popular constitutionalism, scholars have not focused on the relationship between elite economic domination in politics and popular
constitutionalism. In short, the theory’s normative force is limited by the fact that the institutional vehicles needed to realize
popular constitutionalism are subject to elite economic capture. Departmentalism, whether legislative or executive, is obviously subject to elite economic domination, and judicial
elections fare little better. The amount of money spent in such
races is substantial and growing and has a demonstrable effect
on judicial behavior.208 Judicial elections also suffer from a
variety of aristocratic biases (described infra) that afflict elections generally.
Social movements are a more promising vehicle for popular
constitutionalism, but it is far from obvious that social movements are a manifestation of the will of “the people themselves”
in any representative sense.209 Some sociologists argue that
social movement theory has been distorted by the outsized influence of 1960s social movements in shaping perceptions of
“social movements” more broadly. The movements of the
1960s involved disruptive protest in public settings, loosely
coordinated national struggles over political issues, urban/
205
Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1837, 1843–44 (2009).
206
See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–11
(2003); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192–95 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest:
Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 297, 299–301 (2001); Tushnet, Political Law, supra note 196, at 998–99.
207
Pozen, supra note 190, at 2064–66.
208
Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice (2014), http://skew
edjustice.org/ [https://perma.cc/7WKH-UXPU]; Joanna Shepherd, Justice at
Risk: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions,
Am. Const. Soc. (June 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20
Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DGP-VGUK].
209
The literature on social movements and the law is voluminous. For a
review of some of the insights from social movement theory and a forward-looking
research agenda for legal scholarship, see Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional
Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877 (2013).
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campus based protest, and claims by disadvantaged minorities.210 These factors described protests accurately circa 1970.
But by the year 2000, most protests were driven by well-off
white suburbanites.211 The recent Tea Party movement, for
example, consists of a complex mélange of grassroots organizing among largely older, white, male Republicans, with heavy
funding by long-established, billionaire-funded political action
committees and advocacy groups.212 FreedomWorks, one of
these organizations, started organizing the Tea Party the day
after Rick Santelli’s famous rant on CNBC that called for the
creation of a modern tea party213 and the organization’s influence can be seen in the stated policies of Tea Party groups,
some of which are disconnected from grassroots supporters’
priorities.214 Looking back at history beyond the 1960s, social
movements were equally varied in their composition. The Boston Tea Party was an elite-driven protest, and “gentlemen of
property and standing” organized the Jacksonian riots against
abolitionism.215 Recent work in sociology has also documented
in fascinating detail that there have been a variety of organized
“Rich People’s Movements”216 throughout American history.
These movements have been organized by the wealthy to support the financial interests of the wealthy.
The consequence is that popular constitutionalism, as with
other democratic theories, is necessarily more limited than the
optimistic story that its proponents tell about “the people
themselves” wresting constitutional meaning from “High Federalist” judiciary-loving elites in some kind of democratic, populist expression of the public will. If popular constitutionalism’s
aim is simply to get more people involved in shaping constitutional norms, then as a matter of comparative institutional
choice it obviously accomplishes that goal vis-à-vis the numerically small judiciary. But if the aim is that constitutional
meaning will in some sense capture the will of “the people,”
210
Doug McAdam et al., “There Will be Fighting in the Streets”: The Distorting
Lens of Social Movement Theory, 10 MOBILIZATION 1, 2, 16 (2005).
211
Id. at 16.
212
THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF
REPUBLICAN CONSERVATIVISM 9–12, 23 (2012).
213
Id. at 104–05.
214
Skocpol and Williamson point out that Tea Party Patriots, one of the leading Tea Party organizations, is supported by FreedomWorks and prominently
declares its opposition to net neutrality, even though Skocpol and Williamson
never once heard reference to the policy in their research. Id. at 108.
215
Tushnet, Political Organization, supra note 198, at 2.
216
ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS TO
UNTAX THE ONE PERCENT 1–8 (2013).
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understood as even vaguely representative of the whole people,
then it simply is not obvious that the institutions through
which popular constitutionalism operates will accomplish that
goal. Formal institutions like Congress or judicial elections can
be captured in ways that are utterly familiar. Informal populist
movements are not always mass movements or representative,
and while popular constitutionalists are not explicit on this
point, it seems unlikely that most advocates for the theory
would embrace “High Federalists” engaging in social movements and protest to shape constitutional meaning that are
designed to favor the interests of the wealthy.
Of course, this does not mean that popular constitutionalism fails as a descriptive or as a normative matter. Rather, the
point here is simply that popular constitutionalism has been
wholly inattentive to the realities of elite economic domination
in politics—and as a result, that its happy story of the grassroots shaping of constitutional meaning needs to be tempered.
3. Political Parties and Partisanship Theories
One of the most interesting research agendas in constitutional theory in recent years has been incorporating political
parties into structural constitutional theory.217 The Madisonian design notably has no formal role for political parties,
instead relying on institutional structures to provide checks
and balances. On this theory, the division of power between
the executive and the two houses of the legislature, would give
“those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments
of the others.”218 As long as officials’ interests aligned with
their institutional homes, each institution could provide a
check against the others. Similarly, structural division of
power between the states and federal government is supposed
to provide a check on the accumulation of federal power.219
However, scholars argue that it is unlikely that elected officials will pursue policies that advance the power of their particular branch of government, rather than policies that further
217
The leading articles in this area are Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22; Jide
Nzelibe, Our Partisan Foreign Affairs Constitution, 97 MINN. L. REV. 838 (2013).
218
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
219
See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543, 544–46 (1954).
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their policy goals and benefit them politically.220 Professors
Levinson and Pildes show that partisan affiliation “often dominates . . . the constitutional distinction between the branches
in predicting and explaining interbranch political dynamics.”221 As a result, they suggest focusing on the “practical
distinction between party-divided and party-unified government” for explaining interbranch dynamics.222 Achieving, or at
least approximating, the Madisonian goal of divided power and
checks on power requires the separation of parties.223 Other
scholars have taken a similar approach to debates in federalism and foreign affairs law. Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen
points out that when states’ political affiliation clashes with
that of the federal government, they “check the federal government by channeling partisan conflict through federalism’s institutional framework.”224 At the same time, federalism serves
as a laboratory of partisanship, enabling state political parties
to compete and develop new policies.225 Federalism-driven policy innovation, she argues, is largely a function of partisan
conflict. In a recent article, Professor Jide Nzelibe has argued
that the foreign affairs constitution has also been shaped by
partisan dynamics.226 Because foreign affairs issues can be
unbundled, he argues, partisans can advocate for shaping constitutional powers, such as war powers or treaty ratification,
based on their policy preferences.227
In an era of increasing political polarization,228 some scholars have argued that legal reforms should seek to strengthen
political parties.229 Professor Richard Pildes, for example, has
argued that one of the fundamental problems in the contemporary political system is political fragmentation, which has resulted in the “external diffusion of political power away from
the political parties as a whole and the internal diffusion of
power away from the party leadership.”230 What is necessary,
Pildes argues, is to strengthen political parties, particularly vis220

Levinson, Empire-Building, supra note 133, at 929.
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2315.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 217, at 1081.
225
Id. at 1081.
226
Nzelibe, supra note 217, at 839–45.
227
Id. at 841–42.
228
See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 275 (2011).
229
See Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation,
and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 809–10 (2014).
230
Id. at 809.
221
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à-vis minority factions, so that leadership can push members
of the party toward compromises.231 Pildes thus advocates for
allowing parties and candidates to coordinate spending, increasing donation limits to parties, and creating a public financing system that operates through parties.232
While attention to partisanship provides a necessary and
realistic corrective to the existing structural theories, partisan
theorists have been silent on the role of economic power within
American politics.233 Yet inequalities in economic power interact with partisanship in significant ways. In some cases, affluence dominates partisanship as a driver of policy preferences.
Affluent Democrats and Republicans tend to prefer deregulatory policies and oppose social spending at much greater
rates that the general public.234 The divergence in preferences
is particularly important because both Democrats and Republicans are more responsive to affluent constituents than to median or low-income constituents.235 Divided government
mitigates this phenomenon somewhat, by producing gridlock
that reduces the overall amount of policy change. But recall
that even in situations of partisan-induced gridlock, policymakers are still most responsive to the wealthy.236
The consequence is that we should not expect the “separation of parties” approach to work effectively for policy issues in
which both parties are captured by economic elites. Nor
should we expect states to serve as a location for federal policy
contestation—or as a source of policy innovation—on issues in
which economic elites have captured both parties. Similarly, in
foreign affairs, we should expect a consistently more neoliberal
international economic policy than would be produced by a
competitive system of genuinely opposing beliefs. When it
comes to remedying political fragmentation, strengthening parties might in fact make it easier for economic elites to dominate
231

Id. at 809–10.
Id. at 838–41.
233
Levinson and Pildes note that policy positions do not always align with
party affiliation, and they do mention that interest group preferences, along with
geographic, temporal, branch, and other considerations may be drivers of this
cleavage. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2324–25. But they do not focus on
affluence or develop the interest group influence argument. Nzelibe discusses
trade agreements in a limited fashion. Nzelibe, supra note 217, at 858. A notable—and quite recent—exception is Andrias, supra note 12, at 1–7 who explicitly
discusses the findings on economic power in light of partisanship and the separation of powers.
234
Page, Bartels & Seawright, supra note 7, 64–66.
235
See supra subpart I.B.
236
See supra subpart I.B.
232
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politics because elites only have to ensure that they have influence with the two parties—not every single candidate or official.237 In each case, the domination of economic elites means
that policy preferences will be systematically skewed—regardless of the party in power or divided party government. While
partisan contestation can serve to divide power, check power,
and facilitate new ideas, it is less likely to serve these functions
when preferences between most Americans and the wealthiest
diverge.
D. The Historical Origins of Economic Power’s Absence
Why haven’t contemporary constitutional theorists paid
greater attention to economic power? A comprehensive answer
would require an intellectual history of the last half-century of
constitutional scholarship that is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is possible to identify some of the central reasons for
the absence of theorizing on the problem of economic power.
First, with the triumph of the New Deal, a widespread consensus emerged on the constitutionality of regulating the economy.238 Since that time legal scholars have generally accepted
that economic regulation is subject to a lower standard of judicial review, per Carolene Products’239 famous footnote. The
New Deal consensus seems to have been so strongly entrenched that, as Professor Suzanna Sherry has persuasively
shown, this foundational proposition of modern constitutional
law has never been thoroughly defended.240 The breadth of the
consensus is also visible when it comes to the Commerce
Clause. Many commentators—perhaps even most—would
likely have thought it unthinkable that Congress did not have
the power to regulate health insurance under the Commerce
237
Pildes does note that this is a possibility. Pildes, Romanticizing, supra note
229, at 841. For a thorough discussion of how parties might become corrupted,
see Michael S. Kang, Party-Based Corruption and McCutcheon v. FEC, 108 NW. U.
L. REV. ONLINE 240 (2014).
238
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 279–311
(discussing the constitutional significance of the New Deal). LAURA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 13–59 (1996) (describing academic views
toward judicial review in the generation after the New Deal); Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231–32 (1994)
(arguing that the post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional and that
its features have been “taken as unchallengeable postulates by virtually all players in the legal and political worlds, including the Reagan and Bush
administrations”).
239
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
240
Suzanna Sherry, Property is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional
Revolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1468–75 (2015).
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Clause.241 That debate was settled during the New Deal.242
The fact that debates over the Commerce Clause are of recent
provenance and that the Court’s shift from the New Deal consensus is referred to as a revolution is evidence itself of the
strength of the post-World War II consensus.243
As a corollary, for two generations after the Second World
War, the most salient constitutional issues focused largely on
race, gender, and civil rights issues and then on the culture
wars.244 As Fred Schauer has documented, the Supreme
Court’s agenda in constitutional law does not necessarily track
the most salient policy issues for most Americans (which are
often economic).245 This was true during the Warren Court,
with its focus on civil rights and criminal justice, and during
the 1990s and early 2000s when the culture wars were central
topics of conversation in constitutional law.246 Constitutional
theorists were simply focused on a different set of issues during
this time. Indeed, the success of the New Deal consensus
seems to have made economic issues less salient as a matter of
constitutional law.247 To be sure, there were some exceptions,
most notably proposals for establishing constitutional welfare
rights.248 But these proposals were focused on the well-being
of the poor, rather than the dominance of economic elites.249
Two intellectual trends further contributed to the absence
of debates about economic power: the rise of republicanism in
241
See, e.g., Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
265, 266 (2012) (the commerce clause challenge “bordered on frivolous”); Jeffrey
Rosen, Economic Freedoms and the Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 22
(2012) (arguing that overturning the Affordable Care Act would mean a “return to
a pre-New Deal understanding of the Commerce Clause”).
242
And yet five Justices disagree. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
243
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address: Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 827, 827–29 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2004).
244
For a discussion of the intellectual and culture history of these issues
generally, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 111–79 (2011). It is also worth
noting that the lessons of constitutional efforts to bring greater equality in the
racial and gender context might be helpful to thinking about economic equality.
But such a task must be left to another day.
245
Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court 2005 Term Foreword: The Court’s
Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–9, 40 (2006).
246
Id. at 36–46 (discussing the Warren Court era); id. at 14–31 (discussing the
1990s and 2000s).
247
For an intriguing historical account of post-War attempts to turn rights
issues into economic issues, see Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First
Amendment Lochnerism (draft on file with author).
248
For a thorough discussion, see infra section IV.B.2.
249
For a treatment of how debates over poverty changed in the 1980s and
1990s, see RODGERS, supra note 244, at 208–11.
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constitutional theory and history, and the emergence of neoliberalism in economic thought. To the extent constitutional
theorists focused on quasi-majoritarian ideals, the debate centered on civic republican ideas, largely drawing from the work
of intellectual historians Gordon Wood,250 Bernard Bailyn,251
and J.G.A. Pocock.252 The “republican revival” of the 1980s
was one of the biggest developments in American constitutional
thought.253 But while law professors may not have been as
attentive to the underlying historiographical debates, the republican historians were engaged in a broader conflict within
their discipline. For decades, the so-called “progressive” historians had followed Charles Beard in analyzing early American
history as driven primarily by materialistic (particularly economic) forces.254 Ideas and language, on that story, were often
just elite propaganda.255 The republican historians sought to
distinguish themselves from the Beardians and brought ideology back into historical analysis as an independent force.256
By drawing on the republican historians, constitutional theorists necessarily adopted the historians’ preference for ideological, rather than economic, analysis.
During the same period, neoliberalism—a set of ideas and
policies that promote “capitalist imperatives against countervailing democratic ones”—rose to prominence.257 In response
to the economic crisis of the 1970s,258 neoliberalism emerged
as a dominant policymaking framework with the elections of
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan,259 but it also found
favor with political liberals who sought to improve their political fortunes.260 With a market, rather than Marxian, frame250

WOOD, supra note 106.
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967).
252
POCOCK, supra note 106.
253
For a discussion of the republican revival and its relationship to the countermajoritarian problem, originalism, and other intellectual trends and debates in
the legal academy, see generally KALMAN, supra note 238.
254
See id. at 171–72; Jonathan Gienapp, Using Beard to Overcome Beardianism: Charles Beard’s Forgotten Historicism and the Ideas-Interests Dichotomy, 29
CONST. COMMENT, 367, 367–70 (2014).
255
See KALMAN, supra note 238, at 171.
256
See id. at 171–72; Gienapp, supra note 254, at 367–70.
257
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2014).
258
See generally RODGERS, supra note 244, at 41–76 (detailing the economic
crisis of the 1970s).
259
For a discussion, see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM
(2005).
260
See KENNETH S. BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS: THE POLITICS OF LIBERALISM
FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON 80–81 (2000) (noting that in the 1980s, the centrist
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work for understanding forces in society, neoliberalism further
pushed theorists away from class-based analysis.261
Finally, the trends in economic inequality themselves
helped contribute to the absence of debate on economic power
in constitutional discourse. From the end of World War II until
the 1970s, the median male worker’s income continually rose,
alongside GDP.262 From the 1980s onward, wages flattened
out for the average American, even as GDP continued to rise.263
Households with two-working parents, increasing debt, and
little savings could keep up, but they found themselves increasingly squeezed by rising expenses.264 In other words, economic inequality was simply less of a problem in the rising tide
era immediately after World War II.265 In the decades from the
1980s to the Great Recession, inequality grew considerably.266
Constitutional theorists may have been less attentive to issues
of economic power because first, there were lower levels of economic inequality, and then (until the 2008 crash) the trends in
economic inequality were simply less publicly salient.
III
THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC POWER IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Constitutional theory has been surprisingly inattentive to
the problem of economic power—and the result is that leading
theories are limited in their explanatory and normative power.
Addressing the problem of economic power, however, is easier
said than done. Any attempt to address economic power in
constitutional theory will run headfirst into a series of pervaDemocratic Leadership Council adopted more pro-business and market policies
and was criticized by traditional liberals). For a classic statement of these ideas in
the British context, see ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRITICS (2000).
261
See RODGERS, supra note 244, at 77–110 (discussing how market ideology
led to shifts in understanding power in society).
262
U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables. Table P-2: Race and Hispanic Origin by Median Income and Sex, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
income/data/historical/people/ [https://perma.cc/JB2D-CNWS]; St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, Real Gross Domestic Product, FRED Economic Data, https://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC1 [https://perma.cc/Y9GE-6Z5F].
263
Id.
264
See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003) (describing
economic pressures on households during this period, including comparisons to
the early 1970s).
265
See PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 237 (asserting that “the two world wars, and
the public policies that followed from them, played a central role in reducing
inequalities in the twentieth century”).
266
Id. at 294.
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sive, persistent, and even perverse problems. This Part identifies the variety of challenges constitutional theorists will face in
grappling with economic power: the inside-outside problem,
the hydraulic problem, the paradox of process, the aristocratic
character of elections, and the hazards of entrenching economic class. These challenges can be overcome—or at least
mitigated—but they are significant stumbling blocks for anyone interested in institutional design to combat economic
power.
A. The Inside-Outside Problem
The inside-outside problem exists when theorists use real
theory to explain situations (they are outside the system, explaining from an external perspective) and ideal theory to offer
remedies (they are inside the system, taking an internal perspective to how officials should act).267 A simple example will
illustrate. One cannot argue that all officials are motivated by
ideological goals and then suggest that the remedy is for judges
to counteract ideology.268 The analyst in this example has assumed, without explanation, that judges are not motivated by
ideological goals—in direct conflict with the premise of her
argument.
Reforms to address elite economic domination suffer from
this problem. Take any ex post judicial review strategy. Given
that the political process is driven by economic elites and that
the President and the Senate choose federal judges, it is not
clear why judges would interpret laws and statutes in favor of
ordinary-income majorities, rather than skewed in the direction of economic elites.269 Indeed, one of Professor Elhauge’s
additional critiques of proposals for judicial review of interest
group legislation was precisely this: that it was not clear why
the judiciary was a “deus ex machina” unaffected by the same
phenomenon shaping the political process.270 In a speech criticizing the “corporate capture of the federal courts,” Senator
Elizabeth Warren recently suggested that the federal courts do
in fact suffer from the same kind of elite economic domination
that pervades politics.271 Studies show that federal judges
tend to come from corporate law firms, rather than public in267
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2013).
268
See id. at 1754–63.
269
See id. at 1750–53.
270
Elhauge, supra note 171, at 67 (emphasis in original).
271
See Elizabeth Warren, The Corporate Capture of the Federal Courts, Speech
to the American Constitution Society, June, 13, 2013, http://www.warren.senate
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terest or consumer law.272 And they also show that the Court
is increasingly business friendly.273 To be sure, it is possible
that these problems affect the courts less than the other
branches,274 but the basic challenge to judicial review remains.
Other proposals suffer from this problem as well, albeit to
different degrees. Legislative efforts suffer from the insideoutside problem. We should not expect a Congress dominated
by economic elites to act against those interests in order to
curb the power of economic elites. The inside-outside problem
may be slightly mitigated if we think of the bureaucracy as the
relevant actor, given civil service protections, but the expansive
literature on agency capture suggests that the inside-outside
problem operates here too.
Still, the inside-outside problem is not fatal. Obviously,
there have been constitutions that incorporate economic power
into their design, laws that curb campaign spending, progressive taxes, industry regulation, and the like. So what are the
possible ways out of this problem? First, individuals in government may not always be captured by economic elites, or not all
be captured to the same degree. Economic influence might be
less effective on federal judges, given their insulation from
politics and norms of the profession.275 The political science
literature also suggests that Democrats tend to be less solicitous of the wealthy’s views than Republicans are.276 Some
people might also be public spirited or have personal characteristics that push them toward opposing elite preferences.277
In this light, it is possible that actors outside the system—
.gov/files/documents/ACSSpeech_ElizabethWarren.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3KGK-Z6EM].
272
Ellen Eardley & Cyrus Mehri, Defending Twentieth Century Equal Employment Reforms in the Twenty-First Century, 10 AM. CONST. SOC. 12 (Jan. 2013),
https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Eardley_and_Mehri_-_Defending_
Equal_Employment_Reforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TA3-N8RB].
273
See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business
Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1450–52, 1472–73 (2013)
(noting “that five of the ten Justices who . . . have been the most favorable to
business are currently serving”); Doug Kendall & Tom Donnelly, Not So Risky
Business: The Chamber of Commerce’s Quiet Success Before the Roberts Court—
An Early Report for 2012–2013, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., (May 1, 2013), http:/
/theusconstitution.org/text-history/1966/not-so-risky-business-chamber-com
merces-quiet-success-roberts-court-early-report [https://perma.cc/FK3KRDWY].
274
See Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism
After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 224–25 (1997) (arguing that the barriers
to entry and costs of litigation are less significant than in other areas).
275
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 267, at 1789–90.
276
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
277
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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educators, journalists, and others—can, over a long period of
time, push economic elites to hold beliefs that are in greater
alignment with the general population.
Second, policy changes might be more likely during emergencies. During emergencies, political leaders might be willing
to experiment with policies outside of elite norms simply to
address the emergency conditions.278 In addition, if the
wealthy lose much of their wealth, due to a war or emergency,
they may have less influence over policy. Thomas Piketty hints
at this possibility in his study of inequality since the nineteenth
century. He argues that the two World Wars and Great Depression wiped out much of the wealth of western elites and that
fact is what lead to the mid-twentieth century’s unprecedented
levels of economic equality.279 In America, that period also
coincides with new government efforts in economic regulation,
expansion of the franchise, and steeply progressive taxation,
among other things. A similar argument can be made in the
context of environmental disasters and reform legislation: after
a crisis, interest groups that would block legislation in normal
times might have less influence.280 Theories of “constitutional
moments” might thus suggest that in such extraordinary situations economic elites would have less influence.281
Third, mass mobilization or legal fragmentation might lead
to conservative reform. Worried about revolt or simply frustrated by popular ferment, economic elites might agree to reforms out of (according to the inside-outside fallacy) an
irrational fear that more radical changes might be adopted, or
simply to take an issue off the table. In the Progressive Era, for
example, the corporate tax came about in part as a way to
forestall income taxes.282 Similarly, legal fragmentation in a
federal system might lead economic elites to prefer slightly
more regulation at the federal level, instead of a patchwork of

278
See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Oglethorpe Univ. (May 22,
1932) (“[T]he country demands bold, persistent experimentation.”).
279
PIKETTY, supra note 1, 274–75.
280
See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59, 66–67 (1992) (describing the 1970s “republican moments” in
environmental law and noting the exceptional nature of the moment to overcome
normal barriers to policymaking); Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 999 n.3, 1000, 1001 n.8
(2003).
281
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 4–5 (1998).
282
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of
the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1216–17 (2004).
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rules (with the attendant complexity and transaction costs) at
the state level.283
A final possibility is that institutional design might come
from outside the system. While constitutional design is often
thought of as a domestic process involving “we the people,”
historically, this has hardly been true. Occupying powers after
wars, for example, can write constitutions for the losers.284
More interestingly, in the ancient world, foreigners often designed constitutions.285 While they have less information
about the polity, foreign constitutional designers also do not
have an incentive to support their own economic class or listen
disproportionally to the views of economic elites because they
are not repeat players in the community. At the same time, it is
not clear why the country’s population (particularly the economic elites) would agree to a foreign founder.286
B. The Hydraulic Problem
Institutional design attempts to address the influence of
economic elites also suffer from what campaign finance scholars call a “hydraulic” problem. In an important article, Professors Issacharoff and Karlan argued that regulatory efforts to
restrict the flow of money through one channel of campaign
spending would inevitably result in money flowing through
other channels.287 Money, they argued, is like water: it will fill
whatever path is open to it. Deregulation, in turn, enables
money to return back to the channels that were once
blocked.288
The hydraulic problem applies not just to campaign finance efforts but to any effort to cabin the influence of money
in politics. The most obvious example is regulatory capture.
While the attempt to create a professional bureaucracy with
283
See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 330–31 (1985);
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 573 (2001).
284
See RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY 3 (2002).
285
Adriaan Lanni & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Design in the Ancient
World, 64 STAN. L. REV. 907, 910 (2012).
286
One possibility is that misperception would lead all factions within a polity
to simultaneously think that a particular outsider will support their interests. Id.
at 933–34 (making this point about the selection of Solon in ancient Greece).
287
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“[P]olitical money, like water,
has to go somewhere.”).
288
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1,
40–52 (2012).
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expert civil servants was at least partly an effort to bypass
economic influence over policymaking,289 there is a gigantic
literature arguing that regulatory agencies have themselves
been captured by economic elites and industry interest
groups.290 Some pathways for capture, like revolving-door personnel, are obvious,291 but others less so. Consider participation in rulemaking. Administrative law scholars have argued
that while the regulatory state has an elaborate system of notice-and-comment rulemaking in order to ensure transparency
and public participation, industry influence has simply migrated to pre-proposal influence.292
Other institutional design avenues feature the same problem. Political parties, for example, can be captured by wealthy
donors, just like individual candidates.293 Even broader structural solutions suffer from this problem. Imagine the traditional version of mixed government, in which the wealthy exert
influence through one chamber and the working classes
through another chamber of the legislature. What is to stop
the wealthy from seeking to capture the working class chamber
through bribes, campaign advertising, lobbying, or less perceptible routes of influence, such as educational trips and events?
Thinking the hydraulic problem is fatal is, however, a mistake. First, while any particular design element might be
suboptimal in its ability to limit the influence of economic
elites, that does not mean that no attempt at institutional design along these lines would be better. The appropriate comparison is between a system in which certain channels of
influence are restricted and a system in which no channels are
restricted. It may be that restricting the channels most easily
289

See infra section IV.D.2.
The literature is voluminous. For a classic, see George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). For a
recent collection on the scope of the problem and how to prevent it, see generally
CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 156, at 25–68 (compiling works on regulatory
capture).
291
For examples in the financial regulation context, see Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1406–17 (2013).
292
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Agency Lobbying and Financial Reform: A Volcker
Rule Case Study, 32 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 15, 20 (2013) (finding that
93.1% of pre-proposal meetings in the Volcker Rule context were with financial
institutions, law firms, and financial industry groups, and that only 4.2% were
with public interest groups); see also Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41
DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (“Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation what Japanese Kabuki theatre is to human passions—a highly stylized
process for displaying the essence of something which in real life takes place in
other venues.”).
293
Kang, supra note 237, at 252.
290
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abused might still be a net positive in improving outcomes,
even though such restrictions do not solve all problems. Thus,
laws criminalizing bribery may not address campaign spending, but most people concerned about the influence of wealth
would still think a system with such laws is superior to one
without such laws. Second, even if certain design elements are
suboptimal, the system as a whole need not be. As Adrian
Vermeule has noted, “[t]he interaction between several nonideal elements can produce an overall system that is as close
as possible to the ideal.”294 Thus, a constitutional system
might incorporate multiple design strategies that each fail to
effectively restrict the influence of wealth over policy but that
together do so relatively well. In the context of elite economic
influence, it might be that multiple, overlapping strategies create high enough transaction costs and complexity that the hydraulic problem is significantly mitigated.
C. The Paradox of Process
Attempts to address the hydraulic problem run the risk of
what administrative law scholars have called “the paradox of
process.”295 Put simply, those designing institutions might
adopt rules and regulations to increase public participation or
prevent capture, but the well-to-do and their associated interest groups will in practice be better suited to navigate those
rules and regulations.296 As a result, increased process might
have the perverse consequence of actually exacerbating capture, rather than reducing it.
The paradox of process arises from the ability of an individual or group to overcome the barriers to participation. Wealthy
individuals and interest groups, on this theory, can hire lawyers and lobbyists to navigate the political and regulatory process, thereby overcoming the barriers to participation created
by procedural hurdles, while members of the public generally
cannot. As a result, there are disparities in participation and
influence at every stage of the political process.297 Moreover,
when wealthy individuals and interest groups do participate,
their input is often more technically sophisticated, which gives
them greater influence on the substance of the proposal. For
294
Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court 2008 Term Foreword: System Effects
and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (2009).
295
Kevin M. Stack, The Paradox of Process in Rulemaking (manuscript at 2)
(forthcoming).
296
See id. at 2–3.
297
See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA, BRADY, supra note 5, at 6–8.
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example, in the regulatory context, scholars have shown not
only that most public comments come from business groups
(which could be the result of interest, not resources)298 but also
that when the general public comments on proposed regulations, their comments tend to be “form comments” rather than
sophisticated regulatory analysis.299 In that context, it is not
surprising that studies have found that agencies are often more
responsive to regulated industry groups.300 In this example,
the expertise-driven nature of administrative policymaking
serves as the barrier to entry for the general public, but not for
wealthy and organized elites.
The paradox of process operates not just in lobbying Congress and administrative agencies. Consider access to the Supreme Court. While the United States has developed a variety
of interest groups and private law firms that take on constitutional law cases with an eye of bringing them to the Supreme
Court, as a default matter, access to the high court requires
considerable resources. Litigants have to make it through district court and potentially multiple appeals before they can
even file for a writ of certiorari, even in constitutional cases. Or
take campaign and election requirements. A well-financed
candidate can more easily comply with campaign finance reporting requirements, designed to ensure transparency in the
political process, because she can hire campaign professionals
to navigate these procedures. A less well-off candidate will
have a harder time.
While the paradox of process exists in a variety of areas, it
is also not insurmountable. First, in some areas, like litigation,
a leveling up strategy—like public defenders or the ecosystem
of constitutional lawyers—can help increase the ability of ordinary people to navigate the process. Scholars have argued for
greater efforts to increase participation in the regulatory process along these lines.301 A second option is to reduce the
procedural hurdles in the first place. In the regulatory context,
for example, commentators have suggested that technology will
make rulemaking more democratic by reducing the difficulty of
298
Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business?
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133
(2006) (finding 57% of public comments from 4 agencies came from businesses).
299
See Krawiec, supra note 292, at 16–17 (noting that 93% of comments on
“Volcker Rule” were from private individuals, but that more than half used the
identical same form letter and 91% used a variation of that form letter).
300
Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of
EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 128 (2011).
301
Stack, Paradox of Process, supra note 295, at 2.
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public participation and comment.302 Some countries have
gone so far as to simply bypass procedural hurdles altogether
when they get in the way of access. In India, for example, the
Supreme Court can use “epistolary jurisdiction” to grant writ of
certiorari—they take a case based on a letter from an individual.303 While procedural safeguards are likely to restrict access and reinforce inequality, these effects can be mitigated at
least in some cases. Any system that seeks to address inequality in influence will need to consider institutional design strategies that mitigate the paradox of process.
D. The Aristocratic Selection Effects of Elections
In an important book, the intellectual historian Bernard
Manin once described one of the quickest, most striking
changes in the history of constitutional theory: in a matter of
decades in the eighteenth century, elections became universally accepted as a strategy for selecting leaders.304 From ancient Greece until the mid-eighteenth century, lottery was one
of the leading methods for selecting officials in republican governments. In Athens, the leading 600 magistrates were chosen
by lottery.305 In Rome, order of voting among the tribes was
partly determined by lottery.306 In renaissance Florence, simple lotteries and multistage mixed lottery-election systems were
used to choose leaders.307 Republican Venice continued to use
lottery into the late eighteenth century, when its government
finally fell.308 Harrington, Montesquieu, and Rousseau all
devote attention to selection by lottery.309 And yet, in debates
after the American and French Revolutions, lottery is almost
completely absent. The disappearance of lottery from constitutional theory, Manin argues, was rooted in a combination of
Medieval representation practices from the estates of the realm
302
COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING THE POTENTIAL: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING 3
(2008). Still, many are skeptical. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65
U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 402 (2011); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in
Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 949 (2006).
303
Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limitations of
the World’s Most Active Judiciary, 19 POL. STUD. J. 140, 142 (1990).
304
BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 83 (1997).
305
Id. at 11–12; JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS 80 (1989)
306
ANDREW LINTOTT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 46 (1999).
307
JOHN P. MCCORMICK, MACHIAVELLIAN DEMOCRACY 108–09 (2011); MANIN, supra
note 304, at 54–63; ELSTER, supra note 305, at 81–85.
308
MANIN, supra note 304, at 42, 63.
309
Id. at 79.
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and the rise of social contract and natural rights theory.310
With the rise of the idea that government legitimacy was rooted
in the consent of the governed, elections gained dominance
over lotteries as a method for selecting representatives.311
Lost in this transformation was an important argument
about economic class. During and prior to the eighteenth century, political philosophers believed that elections were inherently aristocratic selection mechanisms and lotteries
inherently democratic.312 Manin develops the idea and identifies four characteristics that render elections inherently aristocratic. By their very nature, elections feature the unequal
treatment of candidates by voters, distinction of candidates
because choices must be made, advantages derived from the
salience of candidates, and costs of disseminating information.313 Because all of these factors benefit the aristocratic
class, elections will invariably lead to rule by elites.314 Lottery,
in contrast, does not feature this aristocratic bias; it is inherently democratic because it treats and selects people on equal
terms. To put it differently, lotteries will lead to a standard
distribution in the population serving in government. Elections
will lead to a distribution skewed toward the wealthy.
In the debates over the Constitution, both sides understood that elections had an aristocratic character. One of the
Anti-federalists’ central fears was that representatives would
not actually resemble the people. Samuel Chase, for example,
worried that “there is no probability of a farmer or planter being
chosen . . . only the gentry, the rich, the well born will be
elected.”315 Melancton Smith and others shared this fear, that
elections would lead to a natural aristocracy that meant that
ordinary people would not be represented.316 The Federalists
310
Id. at 83–85 (social contract and natural rights); id. at 86–89 (middle ages);
see also VIEIRA & RUNCIMAN, supra note 112, at 25–26 (describing the radical
changes stemming from Hobbes’s theory of representation).
311
MANIN, supra note 304, at 83–85.
312
See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 13 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
trans., 1989) (“[V]oting by lot is in the nature of democracy; voting by choice is in
the nature of aristocracy.”).
313
MANIN, supra note 304, at 135–45.
314
Id. at 132–60 (making this argument thoroughly); see also John Ferejohn
& Frances Rosenbluth, Electoral Representation and the Aristocratic Thesis, in
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 112, at 271–72 (laying out various types of
“elitist theorists” of democracy).
315
See MANIN, supra note 304, at 112.
316
Melancton Smith, Speech at the New York Ratification Convention (June 21,
1788), in XXII THE DOC. HIST. OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONST. 1748, 1751 (Kaminski et al., eds.); see also Brutus, Essay III, II THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
377, 380 (Herbert Storing, ed.).
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responded with two sets of arguments. First, Madison argued
in Federalist 57 that the new Constitution had no formal requirements that would prefer an economic elite.317 Notably,
neither he nor the other Federalists rebutted the Anti-federalists’ functional concern that independent of formal requirements, elections favor elites.318 Second, the Federalists argued
that elections’ elite effects were in fact desirable because they
would result in leaders who had “most wisdom to discern, and
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society.”319 Put
aside the obvious conflict between these two arguments and
the deeper questions about the goals of representation—in particular, whether the purpose is to select leaders who resemble
the population or are independent of them.320 The critical take
away is that both the Federalists and Anti-federalists agreed
that elections had aristocratic effects.
In this light, some contemporary attempts to make representation more “democratic” can be interpreted as design strategies that water-down the aristocratic nature of electoral
representation. Most directly, in recent years, there has been a
revival of interest—and a flood of scholarship—in lotteries as a
mode of institutional design. Many scholars have explored the
possibility of lotteries to transform democratic political institutions.321 Others have explored the use of lotteries in legal institutions.322 While most of these works focus on lottery as a
mechanism of democracy, the fact that lottery is a strategy to
317

THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 351-52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
318
This may be because the Anti-federalists did not develop their arguments
sufficiently well, MANIN, supra note 304, at 114, and because the Federalists knew
elections would have aristocratic effects, id. at 116.
319
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
320
See PITKIN, supra note 112, at 4.
321
See, e.g., PETER STONE, THE LUCK OF THE DRAW vii (2011); LYN CARSON &
MARTIN BRIAN, RANDOM SELECTION IN POLITICS 2 (1999); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY
AND DELIBERATION 1 (1991); ELSTER, supra note 305, at 27-36; GIL DELANNOI, OLIVER
DOWLEN & PETER STONE, THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION 9 (2013), http://
www.tcd.ie/policy-institute/assets/pdf/Studies_Policy_28_web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/786Q-X479]; Oliver Dowlen, Sorting out Sortition: A Perspective on the
Random Selection of Political Officers, 57 POL. STUD. 298, 299 (2009); Akhil Reed
Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives By Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1283
(1984); Brian D. Feinstein, Congressional Government Rebooted: Randomized
Committee Assignments and Legislative Capacity, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139, 139
(2013); Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of Deliberative Democracy: A Proposal for
a Popular Branch, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 359, 363–64 (2002).
322
See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE 4 (1999); BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 164–67 (1992); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); William Bunting, Note, Election-By-Lot as a
Judicial Selection Mechanism, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 166, 167 (2006).
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erode economic power is less frequently discussed.323 We
might also imagine electoral campaigns as a mechanism for
watering down the aristocratic character of elections. Campaigns seek to undermine preexisting distinctions between individuals standing for office; by the end of the campaign, in
theory, candidates should be equally well-known.324 At the
same time, of course, campaigns require resources, and elites
will be more likely to have or better situated to acquire those
resources. In sum, any system that maintains elections as
opposed to lottery, will suffer from an aristocratic bias. This
poses a persistent problem for democratic or majoritarian institutional design.
E. The Hazards of Entrenching Economic Class
Some attempts to address economic power could suffer
from the problem of entrenching economic class. For example,
the mixed government approach to constitutional structure
recognized class differences explicitly. Other remedies, such as
strategies to give more power to the economically disadvantaged, might similarly recognize class identity. The problem is
that if a society is normatively committed to a broad-based
middle class and opposed to entrenched class inequality, some
institutional design strategies might actually exacerbate classbased divisions and prevent the achievement of a less economically-divided society.
First, at the individual level, explicitly recognizing or designing policies based on economic class could undermine individuals’ attempts to move between economic classes.
Sociological and psychological theories suggest that perceptions about class status can influence an individual’s ability to
successfully undertake actions that are outside of the class
status. Robert Merton famously identified this as a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” which he defined as a “false definition of the
situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally
false conception come true.”325 Applying this theory, people
who identify as part of a lower economic class might perceive
the system overall as hostile to economic mobility (the false
definition) and therefore not act in ways that will enable them
323
For an important exception, see MCCORMICK, supra note 307, at 92 (“To
avoid the ‘aristocratic effect’ of election, ancient democracies assigned most magistracies by citizenwide lotteries.”).
324
For more on this point, see MANIN, supra note 304, at 143.
325
Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. 193, 195
(1948) (emphasis omitted).
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to move up economically (the new behavior), resulting in their
remaining in the lower economic class. One prominent example of this phenomenon has been shown to operate in classrooms, in which teachers’ expectations influence student
performance.326 Variations on this idea are also common in
social psychology literature on behavioral confirmation, in
which studies show that incorrect perceptions can trigger responses that confirm those perceptions.327
Second, at a societal level, explicit class recognition might
entrench class identification, resulting in a society that is stuck
with class divisions. A helpful analogy is the dynamics of consociational constitutional design,328 which involves power
sharing and other strategies to mitigate conflict in societies
divided along ethnic, religious, language, or other lines. One of
the concerns with consociational design is that it can lead to
entrenching—and even radicalizing—the groups that caused
political or military conflict in the first place.329 If designs that
explicitly recognize economic class will entrench, antagonize,
and radicalize members of each class, then such designs might
not be desirable because they will perpetuate rather than mitigate economic divisions.
IV
THE IMPERFECT POSSIBILITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The political science research shows that the mechanisms
by which economic elites dominate policymaking are varied,
including participation through volunteering and voting; cam326
The classic is ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE
CLASSROOM 61–71 (1968) (testing whether “within a given classroom those children from whom the teacher expected greater intellectual growth would show
such greater growth”).
327
Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Behavioral Confirmation in Social
Interaction: From Social Perception to Social Reality, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCH. 148, 151–52 (1978); Mark Chen & John A. Baugh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 545 (1997); Mark Snyder &
Olivier Klein, Construing and Constructing Others: On the Reality and the Generality of the Behavioral Confirmation Scenario, 6 INTERACTION STUD. 53, 54–55 (2005).
328
For a discussion of consociationalism, see infra subpart IV.C.
329
Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6
CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 675 (2006); KIRSTI SAMUELS & VANESSA HAWKINS WYETH, INT’L
PEACE ACADEMY, STATE-BUILDING AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER CONFLICT 5–7
(2006), http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/127-statebuilding-and-constitutional-design-after-conflict.html [https://perma.cc/Y8XS3NUV]; see also ALLISON MCCULLOCH, POWER-SHARING AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN
DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 79 (2014) (“Many scholars argue that [in the context of
peace negotiations,] consociationalism is more likely to entrench existing divisions, thus leading to further instability.”).
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paign donations; the economic background of elected officials;
and the number and composition of lobbyists and interest
groups.330 However, political scientists have not come to an
empirical consensus on which pathway or pathways for economic power determine policy outcomes. Some have found, for
example, that disparities in voter turnout based on income
cannot explain differences in responsiveness.331 Others have
shown that activities do make a difference and that officials are
disproportionately responsive to affluent constituents.332
Absent empirical research identifying a specific mechanism by which economic power exerts influence, constitutional
theorists need to think broadly about the variety of ways in
which economic power operates. Indeed, even if political scientists could show that only one mechanism drives policy outcomes, constitutional theorists would likely still have to attend
to a variety of design options because of the hydraulic problem.
Considering a variety of solutions also allows constitutional
theorists to tailor solutions to their preferred normative theory.
Republicans, majoritarians, and “acting for” representative
theorists might prefer different approaches to mitigating the
problem of economic power’s influence.
This Part provides a conceptual framework of institutional
design approaches that can reduce the influence of the economically powerful. The strategies are grouped into four categories: countering economic inequality, safeguarding the
political process, incorporating countervailing powers into the
political process, and bypassing the political process. The categories follow economic influence from its origins into and
through the political system, identifying the points along the
way in which economic power can be cabined, restricted, channeled, or countered. These design options cascade downward
from prevention to mitigation to resignation, in a sense following Madison’s “two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction:
the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its
effects.”333 In each category, the examples provided cut across
a wide spectrum in terms of plausibility and efficacy, and not
330

See supra Part I.
BARTELS, supra note 61, at 275 (“Income-related disparities in turnout simply do not seem large enough to provide a plausible explanation for the incomerelated disparities in responsiveness documented here.”).
332
SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 5, at 118 (“[A]ctivity by both citizens
and organized interests makes a difference for public policy, and, if anything,
public officials are disproportionately responsive to the affluent and well-educated
members of their constituencies.”).
333
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
331
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all of these strategies are focused on the formal constitutional
structure. Because they involve the intersection of economic
power, political power, and institutional design, some of the
design options operate at a small-c constitutional or subconstitutional level.
This framework identifies the range of institutional design
options and outlines the costs, benefits, and risks of each option. It also allows constitutional theorists to reimagine existing structures and policies that might potentially serve the
function of mitigating economic domination, even if not traditionally justified on those grounds. At the same time, each of
the elements in the framework suffers from one or more of the
persistent problems of economic power. To avoid repetition,
this Part does not restate the persistent problems, but the ultimate consequence of their application is that only a secondbest approach is likely to succeed in mitigating elite economic
domination.
A. Countering Economic Inequality
1. Regulation, Taxation, and the Organization of the
Economy
A variety of non-constitutional regulatory strategies can be
interpreted as attempting to reshape economic power upstream
from the point where it seeks to exert influence over politics.
By changing the scope, preferences, and shape of economic
power, regulatory strategies can help prevent individuals from
gaining too much economic, and therefore political, power in
society. Antitrust, corporate governance, taxation, and common law rules of property and contract are all examples of
regulatory strategies that might have the effect of preventing
the accumulation of extreme economic power, and with it, political influence.
The anti-oligarchy justifications for these regulatory policies were most prominent during the Progressive Era. During
that time, antitrust was focused on the fact that “the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals . . . [could] oppress individuals and injure the public
generally.”334 Louis Brandeis, the most prominent proponent
of this approach, thus “opposed monopolies and trusts, not
because their market power led to higher consumer prices but
because their political power undermined democratic govern334

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
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ment.”335 Progressives thought about the internal regulation of
corporations along similar lines. Walter Lippmann, for example, argued that “[w]ithout democracy in industry . . . there is
no such thing as democracy in America.”336 Industrial democracy was essential not only because “[e]mployers are not wise
enough to govern their men with unlimited power” but also
because self-government depended on democratic control in
important aspects of life.337 Other scholars have pursued
these themes in the common law context, showing not only
that the common law is itself a regulatory regime that constructs the economy338 but also arguing that particular types
of common law rules are essential for a free and democratic
society.339
The justification for corporate taxation followed a similar
narrative. When President Taft issued his message upon adoption of the first corporate tax in 1909, he focused on corporate
power: “While the faculty of assuming a corporate form has
been of the utmost utility in the business world, it is also true
that substantially all of the abuses and all of the evils which
have aroused the public to the necessity of reform were made
possible by the use of this very faculty.”340 In recent years,
scholars have stressed the importance of taxing individuals’
wealth, on largely the same grounds.341
More recently, scholars have proposed structural regulation of industry to prevent industry power from capturing government. As Professor Adam Levitin has argued, the structure
of the regulated industry, which is itself constructed by regulation, can contribute to the likelihood of legislative and agency
capture.342 Using the financial industry as an example and
335

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 211 (1996).
WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 59 (Mitchell Kennerley 1914) (2015).
337
Id. at 59. John Dewey focused on similar themes. “What does democracy
mean,” he asked, “save that the individual is to have a share in determining the
conditions and aims of his own work; and that . . . through the free and mutual
harmonizing of different individuals, the work of the world is better done than
when planned, arranged, and directed by a few . . . ?” See ROBERT B. WESTBROOK,
JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 107 (1993); see also id. at 179, 187, 400.
338
ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 1–12 (1952); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 68–93 (1993).
339
See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a
Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1046–47 (2009) (arguing
that property law has a role to play ”in a free and democratic society that treats
each person with equal concern and respect.”).
340
Avi-Yonah, supra note 282, at 1219.
341
PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 493–97.
342
Adam Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2058–65 (2014).
336
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channeling the pluralist gloss on Federalist 10, Levitin argues
that when an industry is fragmented—for example, small versus large banks, retail versus financial services—”the influence
of the competing groups can be cancelled out, leaving legislators and regulators space for more neutral policy analysis.”343
But his more important point is that regulation itself shapes
the interest group environment. The Glass-Steagall regime, for
example, separated insurance, investment banking, and depository institutions.344 The effect was not just to separate
these lines of business within the economy, but also to break
up “the political power of the financial services industry.”345
Each portion of the industry became rivals, which also allowed
members of Congress to support one faction against the
other—thereby passing legislation that might not have been
viable otherwise.346
Whether any of these regulatory measures are desirable is
up for debate. It is certainly possible that attempts to curtail
the scope of economic power could have detrimental collateral
consequences. Burdensome regulations might curtail economic growth and innovation. Badly-designed tax systems
might do the same. For those who see the primary goal of
institutional design as facilitating economic efficiency or free
market libertarianism, these strategies are likely to be not only
undesirable but also affirmatively harmful. For those who take
a more moderate approach and also recognize that these strategies can have anti-oligarchic effects, the question becomes
one of balancing the likely economic costs against the possible
benefits to political freedom. The point here is not that these
strategies are certainly desirable in the contemporary context
as ways to curb economic power, but rather that they are, and
have historically been, seen as tools that can be used for this
goal.
2. The Economic Ulysses: Precommitting Against
Inequality
Although a society may be economically equal when its
constitution is written, it might not remain economically equal
as changes in the economy occur over time. Even if we could
therefore design a constitution that is majoritarian at the start,
how can constitutional design ensure that democratic majori343
344
345
346

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2059.
2060.
2061.
2062.
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ties will continue to rule over time given changes in the economic background conditions?
One possibility is to adopt rules, ex ante, that will prevent
extreme forms of economic inequality—and therefore extreme
divergences in political power. In doing so, the example of
Ulysses tying himself to the mast—a classic of contemporary
constitutional theory347—could be reimagined in light of the
realities of economic power. On this theory, constitutions are a
way for people, at time one, to bind themselves to a set of
policies that, at time two, they might find hard to maintain.
This precommitment strategy allows the people to remain on
their predetermined path, even if there are changes in the
future.348
With precommitment theory as inspiration, one approach
to designing around economic power would be for society to
bind itself to constitutional policies that prevent the emergence
of economic inequality, or at least elite economic domination of
policymaking. A few examples will be helpful. Imagine a constitutional provision that required that if wealth inequality
(however defined) reached a certain level, extremely high income, wealth, and estate tax rates would immediately take effect for those at the highest wealth echelons. This provision
would precommit the society to preventing widespread wealth
disparities through this self-correcting policy. Importantly, the
proposal accounts for the possibility that at time two, when
there is significant wealth inequality, it might not be possible
for popular majorities to institute such a policy through ordinary legislative means precisely because wealth inequality has
led to economic elites dominating politics. Another possibility
would be to structure such a proposal with respect only to
political influence. Thus, imagine a provision stating that if
wealth inequality reaches a certain level, a variety of politically347
For the classic treatment of this theory, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND
1–3 (2000).
348
Scholars have, of course, identified situations in which the theory is more
or less persuasive. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some
Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1761
(2003) (some constitutional provisions emerge from a political haggle, not rational
choices about the future); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 266–75 (1999)
(some provisions involve contestable moral questions that might change or manifest differently over time and with new information and norms); Adam M. Samaha,
Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606,
655–60 (2008) (discussing the problem of dead hand preferences dominating the
current time). There is also the tricky problem of why any intertemporal commitment holds. For a discussion of this challenging issue, see Levinson, Parchment
and Politics, supra note 133, at 665.
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relevant laws would be triggered immediately: laws making
unionization easier, campaign finance restrictions, lobbying
rules. Again, society would be precommitting itself to restricting the political power of economic elites as the risks of their
disproportionate influence grow stronger.
Of course, these economic variations on the Ulysses story
have their benefits and drawbacks. On the positive side,
precommitment gets around the possibility that rising economic inequality will create a political process failure that
makes public policy reforms to advance populist or democratic
influence unlikely. At the same time, it is not obvious whether
the precommitted design strategies (taxes, campaign finance
rules, or what have you) would be responsive to the pathways
that economic elites are using to influence politics (at time two)
when the precommitment policies are triggered. Still, the economic power approach provides a new twist on this classic of
constitutional theory—and in a way that can help theorists
consider how to manage the problem of changing economic
conditions.
B. Safeguarding the Political Process
A second strategy starts from the premise that economic
inequality in society is inevitable (or perhaps even desirable) to
some degree—but that it need not influence the political process. Institutional design should therefore protect, or safeguard, the political process from the influence of economic
elites. On this approach, the problem is not that there are
economic elites in society, but simply that they have outsized
influence over legislative outcomes. Insulating politics from
economic power addresses this problem. The safeguard strategy appears in ex ante and ex post forms.
1. Ex Ante: Campaign Finance and Lobbying Restrictions
The most prominent method for protecting the political
process is to attempt, ex ante, to limit the wealthy’s influence
over the political process. The basic idea is that restrictions on
types of participation—most saliently campaign spending and
lobbying—can contain disproportionate influence that is a
function of wealth inequality.349 These strategies restrict influence upstream from the moment of the political decision.
349
Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together,
19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 108 (2008) (“Lobbying and campaign finance,
however, also raise common concerns about unequal wealth and improper influence over the political process.”); id. at 119 (“Prevention of improper influence over
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Traditionally, campaign finance reform efforts have followed this strategy. The logic is simple: money corrupts the
political process and disparities in money corrupt the political
process in a direction that favors the wealthy. Therefore,
money must be restricted from politics.350 This approach has
“defined the modern era of campaign finance reform,”351 and it
can be justified based on an analogy to free markets,352 political incentives and responsiveness to citizens,353 or transaction
costs.354 The approach is best exemplified by the newly-defunct “undue influence” justification for campaign finance restrictions. Until Citizens United355 and McCutcheon v. FEC,356
the Supreme Court generally recognized two versions of corruption: quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, and undue influence.357 On the undue influence theory, “the source
of corruption was large expenditures capturing the marketplace of political ideas, and the corrupted entities were, at bottom, the voters who could only succumb to the entreaties of
money.”358 Thus, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Court recognized that special corruption that comes
with “immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form.”359 While focusing there on
corporations, the Court’s recognition that wealth can distort
government decision-making is a primary concern for both campaign finance and
lobbying regulation.”).
350
Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 118
(2010); Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION
L.J. 75, 87 (2014)
351
Issacharoff, supra note 350, at 118.
352
David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 237 (1991).
353
Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2011)
354
Kang, End of Campaign Finance, supra note 288, at 56–57.
355
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
356
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
357
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–92 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–28 (1976) (per curiam); see also McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 121 (2003) (distinguishing “real” and “apparent” quid pro quo
corruption); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (“This Court has long recognized ‘the governmental interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption’ in election campaigns.”); McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143–45 (2003) (discussing the importance of prohibiting the
appearance of “undue influence”). For a general discussion, see Issacharoff,
supra note 350, at 121–22.
358
Issacharoff, supra note 350, at 122.
359
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see also
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that states have an
interest in preventing institutions from “using . . . wealth to acquire an unfair
advantage in the political process”).
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political outcomes applies more broadly to wealth inequality
generally. The Court’s “antidistortion” rationale for campaign
finance reform was directly targeted at curbing the influence of
the wealthy.
With the Court’s decisions in Citizens United and McCutcheon foreclosing the “undue influence” route to campaign finance reform, a number of scholars have turned instead to
restrictions on lobbying.360 The insight is another version of an
ex ante safeguard, just one that operates further downstream
in the political process from campaign finance restrictions. Instead of restricting influence in campaigns, these proposals
restrict influence in lobbying Congress. Lobbying restrictions,
such as anti-revolving-door laws, fundraising restrictions, and
restrictions on gifts, are all designed on the theory they that
make it harder for individuals or interest groups to purchase
influence with lawmakers.361
2. Ex Post: Political Process Theory and Judicial Review
Safeguarding politics need not take place prior to the political process. Looking further downstream, judicial review could
take place after the moment of political decision. Taking an ex
postperspective to safeguarding the political process from elite
economic domination, one could imagine judges reviewing and
giving some form of heightened scrutiny to legislation that either benefits economic elites or harms median-income Americans, when there is not widespread popular consensus on the
policy. In other words, judges would let “democracy by coincidence” pass without much scrutiny but give a far closer look at
legislation that most Americans oppose and economic elites
support. Note also that on this approach the Court would not
need to give heightened scrutiny to legislation that harms the
interests of the wealthy. Because the wealthy have substantial
ex anteinfluence over political outcomes, they would not need
an after the fact judicial safety net.
This ex post approach is similar to proposals from the
1980s suggesting judicial review of interest group legislation,362 though it diverges from those approaches in a significant way. The earlier generation of constitutional scholars
recognized that legislation might not be majoritarian, but they
360
Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 197 (2012); Gerken, supra note 353, at 1155; Zephyr Teachout, The
Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 7 (2014).
361
Hasen, supra note 360, at 198.
362
See supra section II.C.2.
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did not have the benefit of data describing exactly how legislation diverges from majority preferences.363 In light of the empirical evidence, heightened judicial review would not be
focused on interest groups broadly understood but rather only
on the wealthy and on business and corporate interest groups.
In essence, this approach puts an economic power twist on
political process theory. On John Hart Ely’s theory, drawing
from Carolene Products’364 footnote four, judicial review was
justified when either particular groups are denied formal participation in the political processes or when “discrete and insular” groups suffer from prejudice despite being enfranchised.365
Some scholars criticized Ely’s theory in much the same way
that Elhauge criticized the interest group theories: the theory
does not eliminate normative considerations because judgments have to be made about which groups should be protected.366 Other scholars argued that the second prong of the
theory was on particularly weak foundations, as it is more
likely that “discrete and insular” groups will have political
power, given their ability to overcome collective action
problems.367 In contrast, “anonymous and diffuse” populations are “systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist
democracy.”368
363
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Vanishing Constitution, supra note 167, at 78–79
(describing non-majoritarian factors that influence the legislative process including lack of overlap between voting population and total population, interest group
influence, personal preferences of elected officials, logrolling, and other factors).
364
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
365
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 135–36 (1980).
366
See Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 172, at 1072–76 (making the
point that some groups must win); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town:
The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037,
1038 (1980) (arguing that Ely’s theory violates the principle of value-free adjudication). For a helpful discussion of Ely’s recognition of the substantive foundations of his theory and a clear discussion of the distinction between democratic
process based theories, like Ely’s, and substantive legitimation theories, see generally Frank I. Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search:
Tribe on Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891 (2007).
Interestingly, scholars using recent data from political scientists have both supported and subverted the conventional approach to protected classes, finding that
women, African-Americans, and the poor are powerless in the political process at
both the state and federal levels. See Stephanopolous, supra note 177, 1594–95.
367
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724
(1985). For a helpful review of the arguments against the second prong, see
Klarman, Puzzling Resistance, supra note 164, at 784–88. Note that some scholars have argued that campaign finance laws should be struck down on political
process grounds because they serve to protect incumbents. Steven G. Calabresi,
The Constitution and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 13, 18 (2012). Cf. Klarman,
Majoritarian, supra note 160, at 497–502 (arguing for judicial review in cases of
entrenchment problems).
368
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, supra note 367, at 724.
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In the context of elite economic domination, a reimagined
political process approach would put a thumb on the scale in
favor of the anonymous and diffuse majority of middle- and
low-income Americans who are politically less influential than
the elites.369 “Representation-reinforcement” through judicial
review thus shifts from protecting minorities to protecting majorities. Because the political process is broken in consistent
ways that favor the wealthy when majority preferences diverge,
heightened scrutiny for such legislation can serve as a remedy
for the tilted playing field.370 While this approach still requires
a normative judgment in favor of majoritarianism, it is rooted
in the empirical baseline of policy outcomes. The normative
question thus shifts to whether the status quo (the empirical
baseline of the wealthy dominating policy outcomes) is normatively more or less desirable than the reimagined process theory (heightened scrutiny for legislation that, depending on how
it is designed, benefits the wealthy or harms the majority).
In this light, it is also worth revisiting conversations about
constitutional welfare rights—rights for the poor that scholars
have traditionally rooted in either Rawlsian371 or Walzerian372
conceptions of justice. The reality of economic power suggests
that political process theory might be another tractable source
for justifying certain kinds of welfare or social-citizenship
rights. Rather than focusing on individualized hearings for in369
Of course, this point diverges substantially from Carolene Products, which
was based on the premise that economic regulations were presumptively constitutional. Footnote four simply suggested exceptions for when heightened review
might be appropriate.
370
Note also that judicial review could operate either through political process
failures in the legislature justifying substantive judicial review or the political
process failures justifying judicial review of the process itself. For a discussion of
both of these approaches, see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to
Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1959 (2011).
371
The classic statements are Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14–15 (1969);
Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966–67 (1973); Frank I.
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
659, 668–70 (1979). See also Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987) (advocating “a
constitutional right to a ‘survival’ income”). For an intellectual history of the
evolution of constitutional welfare rights, see generally William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1821 (2001). For a response, see Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1893 (2001).
372
Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
203, 209–10 (2008).
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dividuals who are denied social programs,373 this approach
would focus instead on political process failures. Judicial review of the legislative process—namely, of legislative choices
that adversely affect the majority—would be justified in order
to ensure that majority preferences, not the views of economic
elites, are instituted into law.374 While this approach would
not cover all welfare rights (those of the poor would be susceptible to legislative revision by the majority), it could protect
broad-based or universal economic programs like Social
Security.
A related analogy is the Lochner-era theory of judicial review for class, or partial, legislation. On the revisionist story of
the Lochner era, the central issue was not laissez-faire constitutionalism.375 Rather, courts would evaluate whether regulations issued pursuant to the police power were based on health
and public safety justifications and therefore were “general legislation” benefitting the public as a whole, or whether they were
in fact intended to benefit only a part of the population and
therefore were impermissible as “partial” or “class” legislation.”376 An ex post approach to safeguarding politics from
economic elites would not be so different from this model, except that it would seek to enforce “democracy by coincidence”
instead of “general legislation.” In other words, this approach
would be translated into our time as a simple majority-enforcement rule.
Beyond the persistent problems, many of which would apply in this context, the biggest problem with an ex post approach is practical. Judges would have to determine which
pieces of legislation had support from the majority.377 It is not
373
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that “due process
requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits”); see also
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
374
Interestingly, then-Professor Goodwin Liu took a step in this direction,
suggesting that the Walzerian approach to welfare rights would focus on judicial
review of the legislative process to ensure a connection to evolving democratic
norms. Liu, supra note 372, at 253–60; see also Stephanopolous, supra note 177,
at 1546–53 (discussing judicial review in the context of groups).
375
There is, of course, the original story of the Lochner era, focused on laissezfaire and now a counterrevisionist literature on Lochner that focuses on
unenumerated powers. For the latter, see generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner
Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2003); BERNSTEIN, supra note 11.
376
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 10 (1993); G. Edward White,
Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 87, 88–89 (1997).
377
This may be difficult, but it seems that at least Justice Holmes approached
constitutional adjudication in something akin to this manner. See Adrian
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entirely clear whether there is a reliable way for them to do so,
given that polling itself can be manipulated. In addition, however, the ex post approach raises significant costs in terms of
legal predictability. Frequent legal challenge might create undesirable delays implementation and jeopardize public
reliance.
C. Incorporating Countervailing Powers into the Political
Process
In the grand sweep of the Western tradition, the conventional strategy for controlling the power of economic elites was
to incorporate countervailing powers directly into the political
process. This strategy is based on three assumptions. First, it
implicitly rejects the notion that economic disparities can be
prevented altogether, instead assuming the persistence of economic cleavages (in contrast to the goals of the countering economic inequality approach). Second, it implicitly rejects the
notion that economic inequality can be prevented from influencing politics, instead assuming the economic power will influence politics (in contrast to the goals of the safeguarding the
political process approach). Finally, it assumes that economic
cleavages correlate with policy preferences across a range of
issues. This third assumption—coherence across policy issues
within each economic class—is at the core of the countervailing
strategy’s institutional design remedy. When policy coherence
and economic class are in alignment, constitutional engineers
can build economic class directly into the constitutional
structure.
Incorporating countervailing powers378 into the structure
of government takes two forms. First, the separation of economic powers directly incorporates economic class into government structure. This form of design was common in the
ancient world, but is implausible (and probably undesirable) in
the modern context. Still it offers an analogy (and perhaps
even a justification) for understanding contemporary design
debates and even some modern institutions such as the jury,
public ombudsmen, and perhaps even universal suffrage. SecVermeule, Beard & Holmes on Constitutional Adjudication, 29 CONST. COMMENT.
457, 465–70 (2014).
378
I take countervailing power from JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 135–37 (1952). Galbraith argued that “the group that seeks countervailing
power is, initially, a numerous and disadvantaged group which seeks organization
because it faces, in its market, a much smaller and much more advantaged
group,” id. at 142, and he illustrated the concept with the rise of labor unions, visà-vis managers, id. at 136–39.
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ond, leveling up strategies seek to increase the political power
of those without wealth, though not in as institutionalized a
manner of formal strategies. Labor’s political power and campaign finance strategies that seek to inject more money into
politics are the best examples.
1. The Separation of Economic Powers
If we were to revive the tradition of mixed government, our
constitutional system would speak less of the “separation of
powers” and more of the “separation of economic powers.” Aristotle defined constitutional government along these lines,
stating that “constitutional government” involved “the admixture of the two elements, that is to say, of the rich and poor.”379
Historically, there have been a number of strategies along
these lines, and we can think of them as legislative, executive,
and electoral. The most prominent approach is the legislative:
divide power between the two branches of the legislature, while
restricting admission to each house of the legislature by
wealth. Mixed government theory was thus based on “the belief
that the major interests in society must be allowed to take part
jointly in the functions of government, so preventing any one
interest from being able to impose its will upon the others.”380
Importantly, unlike later Separation of Powers theories, mixed
government was rooted in economic class.381 The Medieval notion of the “estates of the realm” offers one example of this
strategy, dividing society into nobles and commons, and entrenching each into the political process.382 Another example
is one of the Florentine Republic’s governing bodies, the
Signoria, whose members were selected through “occupationalspecification and randomization.”383 Two of the six available
seats on that body were reserved for members of each of the
three major occupational guilds.384
Taking a literal approach to translating the legislative approach to mixed government theory into modern practice is
379
380

ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 124 (Jowett trans., Oxford University Press 1885).
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 37 (2d ed.

2012).
381

Id. at 7, 37.
The English philosopher, James Harrington, famously argued that the rise
of the middle class is what led to the collapse of the Tudor “mixed monarchy”
system. See JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF
POLITICS 58–60 (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1992).
383
MCCORMICK, supra note 307, at 101.
384
Id. at 101. The structure still weighted power to the smaller set of major
guilds (or wealthier and higher-status individuals), but it ensured participation
from members of the minor guilds. Id.
382
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wildly unrealistic. But it is worth considering as a thought
experiment, as it is both inherently interesting and helpful in
making connections to modern design strategies. Imagine reforms to the qualifications for entrance into the House and
Senate. Instead of simply focusing on age requirements,385
constitutional engineers could focus on wealth requirements—
for example, a cap on the wealth of eligible candidates for the
House of Representatives. Of course, the Senate has different
constitutional powers from the House of Representatives, including the “advise and consent” power with respect to treaties
and Executive Branch nominees.386 Designers inspired by
mixed government could therefore think about instituting
countervailing powers within the Senate itself. For example,
one senator from each state could be required to have below a
certain wealth level. Importantly, there would be no need to
require that the Senate have a wealth floor: because the
wealthy have sufficient ability to protect their interests through
elections and political advocacy generally,387 a special body
restricted only to the wealthy may not be necessary. As surprising as these proposals sound, variations on these themes
have actually been proposed in American history.388
While “modern mixed government” might be fanciful, the
legislative approach provides a new lens through which to view
existing proposals within institutional design. Consider, for
example, theories of consociationalism. Consociationalism involves constitutional design for societies divided along social,
ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, and uses entrenched structures such as federalism, power sharing executives, and proportional representation to ensure the representation of
different groups.389 Where consociationalism focuses on ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages, countervailing power
focuses on economic cleavages. In both contexts, the premise is
the same: homogeneity is more stable than division, but consti385

See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
Id. at art. II, § 2.
387
See generally MANIN, supra note 304, at 132–60 (discussing the aristocratic
nature of elections).
388
See, e.g., ALBERT M. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
211–12 (1914) (arguing for a more populist legislative system, but with “a second
legislative chamber in which the representatives of property interests shall sit”).
389
See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 25 (1977) (defining
consociationalism). For the classic treatment, see generally Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969). See also Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 96 (2004); Juan J.
Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 14, 26
(April 1996).
386
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tutional design can manage and mitigate the ill-effects of divided societies.390 Yet while power sharing along cultural lines
is widely accepted as a form of constitutional design, contemporary constitutional theory rarely discusses power sharing
along economic lines.391
As a second example, proposals for greater deliberative democracy can be interpreted as a weaker form of the legislative
mixed government strategy. The literature and variation in
proposals in this area is vast: scholars and activists have proposed “minipublics,” small groups of citizens who deliberate on
policy issues and either advise officials or themselves vote on
policy;392 “Deliberation Day,” a national day for citizens to deliberate and vote;393 referenda; citizen assemblies;394 citizen
advisory councils;395 and participatory budgeting.396 Regardless of the specific mode, the central thrust of these varied
390
In the mixed government context, the best statement remains Aristotle’s:
“[I]t is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the
middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered in which the
middle class is large, and larger if possible than both the other classes, or at any
rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and
prevents either of the extremes from being dominant.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 379,
at 128.
391
At the minimum, in a society in which economic cleavages are salient and
entrenched, consociational-style design strategies can be seen as a form of modern mixed government. More broadly, some economists have recently argued that
in the absence of major disruptions like the twentieth century’s two world wars,
capitalism inherently creates increasing levels of economic inequality. See
PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 20–27. If we accept that argument, then constitutional
design in democratic capitalist states might want to be particularly attentive to
design strategies that mitigate economic cleavages. To be sure, one might argue
that there is a difference between characteristics that are more-or-less entrenched
or immutable (i.e. that religion or ethnicity or race are different in degree or kind
from economic class). But the strength of such an argument inevitably turns on a
variety of contextual factors: the degree of equality at birth in the society, the
degree of economic mobility in the society, and the like. In any event, the point
here is simply to note that contemporary constitutional theorists often focus
design to address cultural divisions, and that mixed government is analogous
albeit applied to economic divides.
392
ROBERT E. GOODIN, INNOVATING DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
AFTER THE DELIBERATIVE TURN 11–19 (2008); DELIBERATIVE MINI-PUBLICS: INVOLVING
CITIZENS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 1–3 (Grönlund et al. eds., 2014).
393
JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC CONSULTATION 29–31 (2009); BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 1–5 (2005); Ackerman & Fishkin, Deliberation Day, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 7, 7 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); see also JAMES
S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY 161–76 (1995)
(proposing “deliberative polls”).
394
GRAHAM SMITH, DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS: DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS FOR CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION 30–39 (2009).
395
Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in
Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 5, 9–10 (2001).
396
Id. at 10–12.
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proposals is to facilitate democratic participation by a wider
range of people than their duly elected representatives. Surprisingly, however, advocates for these proposals generally do
not focus on the possibility that these proposals can serve as
strategies to counterbalance elite economic rule.397 Yet the
design strategy is strikingly similar to that of mixed government. In each case, citizens at large are incorporated directly
into the political process.
The legislative approach is not the only path for countervailing power. Republican Rome instituted countervailing powers into the structure of government through the creation of
what we would consider an executive branch office: the Tribune
of the Plebeians. Restricted only to plebeians, Tribunes had
the power of intercessio, or the ability to veto, any action—
prosecutorial or policy—at any stage in the process.398 Although political theorists throughout history have drawn on
the Tribune of the Plebs to inspire constitutional design,399 a
“modern tribunate” seems unlikely.400
397
A notable exception is Archon Fung, Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future, 75 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
513, 521 (2015). Fung describes how social justice has motivated some efforts at
participatory governance, but also notes that the social justice impetus for participatory designs has been eclipsed by other design goals.
398
LINTOTT, supra note 306, 32–33, 121–25; FRANK FROST ABBOT, A HISTORY AND
DESCRIPTION OF ROMAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 198–99 (1901); see also R. T. Ridley,
Notes on the Establishment of the Tribunate of the Plebs, Latomus, T. 47, Fasc. 3
(JUILLET-SEPTEMBRE 1968) at 535, 537 (focus on economic motives).
399
When Machiavelli proposed a revitalization of the Florentine Republic in
the sixteenth century, he proposed the creation of “provosts,” akin to the Roman
Tribunes. Provosts would be “drawn from the ranks of common citizens exclusively and rotated by lot into the Signoria and the senatorial council, to delay the
decisions of such bodies and appeal them to the Great Council.” MCCORMICK,
supra note 307, at 103. Some scholars of American constitutional thought have
argued that the Roman Tribunate partly inspired John C. Calhoun’s theory of
concurrent majorities. Mitchell Franklin, The Roman Origin and the American
Justification of the Tribunitial or Veto Power in the Charter of the United Nations, 22
TUL. L. REV. 24, 25–26, 31–32 (1947); Mitchell Franklin, Problems Relating to the
Influence of the Roman Idea of the Veto Power in the History of Law, 22 TUL. L. REV.
443, 443–45 (1948).
400
Professor John McCormick has recently argued for the creation of a modern American tribunate. His tribunate would include fifty-one citizens, chosen by
lottery, for a one-year term. They would be compensated, get their jobs back
when their service is complete, and be given other incentives (e.g., free college for
children). Tribunes would be chosen from the population, but the top 10% by
household wealth would be excluded, as would elected officeholders. The tribunate would be empowered to veto one statue, executive order, and Supreme Court
decision per yearly term, in addition to calling one national referendum in which
campaign spending would be severely restricted. Three-fourths of the tribunate
would have the power to institute impeachment proceedings against federal officials. Tribunes themselves would be disciplined by future tribunates having the
authority to indict prior tribunes for misconduct. Finally, the modern tribunate’s
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Still, the Tribunate model may help us think differently
about existing institutions. In light of well-known economic
inequality in the criminal justice system, jury participation,
and at the extreme, jury nullification, could be interpreted as
serving a similar function to the Roman tribune’s clemency
power because local juries are drawn from a non-elite, nonexpert, non-economically powerful general public.401 In a
purely executive capacity, consider the position of “public advocate” or “ombudsman” that many states and cities have established to focus on investigating citizen complaints.402 First
adopted in the United States in the 1960s,403 ombuds serve
investigatory, oversight, and advocacy functions, with a focus
on protecting individuals from “the excesses of public and private bureaucracies.”404 American ombuds and public advocate
positions are nowhere near as strong as the Tribunate, but the
powers could not be weakened, only strengthened. MCCORMICK, supra note 307,
at 183–85.
401
On jury participation serving a democratic function, the classic remains
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 258–64 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop trans., 2000). The classic article on jury nullification is Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995). Of course, juries are not necessarily representative of the population writ-large, so a countervailing power justification for jury
participation or nullification would probably need to be coupled with reforms of
jury selection and peremptory challenge procedures.
402
For examples of states that have ombudsmen, see Public Counsel
(Ombudsman’s Office), Nebraska, http://nebraskalegislature.gov/divisions/
ombud.php [https://perma.cc/XU9M-YAH6]; Arizona Ombudsman: Citizen’s
Aide, http://www.azleg.gov/ombudsman/ [https://perma.cc/B8DB-AFXL];
State of Hawaii, Office of Ombudsman, http://ombudsman.hawaii.gov [https://
perma.cc/J6HX-J66F]; State of Iowa, Office of Ombudsman, https://
www.legis.iowa.gov/Ombudsman/ [https://perma.cc/8SZ9-589M]; Office of
Ombudsman, Alaska, http://ombud.alaska.gov [https://perma.cc/98JV-BHAR];
Public Advocate of New York, http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov [https://perma.cc/
QLF6-7RCZ].
403
See Mark Green & Laurel W. Eisner, The Public Advocate for New York City:
An Analysis of the Country’s Only Elected Ombudsman, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1093, 1104–05 (1998). The 1809 Swedish Constitution first established a position of ombudsman, and debates from the time suggest that the Roman tribunate
may have been an inspiration for the post. Stig Jagerskiold, The Swedish
Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1080, 1079 & n.8 (1961). It seems that the
more proximate inspiration was the role of attorney general. Id. at 1079. Among
other things, the Swedish ombudsman serves as a prosecutor, with the formal
power to try impeachment cases against the highest state officials (though not
initiate them) and to initiate proceedings against lower judges. The ombudsman
even has the power to prosecute members of a court, if she finds the court at fault
in dismissing her actions (though this has never happened). Id. at 1087.
404
ABA, Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices 1
(Feb. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leader
ship/2004/dj/115.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BMT-AY5X]. For an
early American treatment, see generally Kenneth Culp Davis, Ombudsmen in
America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1961)
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ABA, for example, has recommended that ombuds should be
granted subpoena power and the ability to initiate litigation or
administrative actions.405
A final approach to countervailing power reimagines universal electoral suffrage as a form of mixed government. Given
that elections are inherently aristocratic,406 universal suffrage
operates as a countervailing force against their aristocratic
character. Such elections have a democratic component because suffrage enables mass electoral participation, but they
also have an aristocratic component rooted in the inherent
nature of electoral choice.407 Together, then, modern elections
are a particularly clever form of mixed government. One
scholar has even gone so far as to suggest that in a world of
mass suffrage, the Supreme Court’s permissive campaign finance rules, which favor economic elites, can be interpreted as
a way to guarantee that the rich have influence over the political process.408 He does not link the idea to mixed government
directly, but permissive campaign spending rules could be seen
as akin to giving the wealthy countervailing power over elections. Given the aristocratic nature of elections, such additional protections are probably unnecessary. But viewed
through this lens, Citizens United and similar cases take on a
very different flavor.
2. Leveling Up Strategies
Instead of formally incorporating countervailing powers
into government, or seeking to facilitate their representation in
government, a second strategy is to increase the ability of countervailing powers to have influence within the political process.
If part of the problem is that wealthy and corporate groups
have more access and influence than middle-income people
and the groups that represent them, then a “leveling up” strategy would find ways to increase the power of the weaker
groups. Leveling up enables weaker groups to contend with (or
at least not fall so far behind) more powerful groups in the
political process.
(“[P]resent[ing] for American consideration . . . the idea that lies behind the institution of the Ombudsman in the Scandinavian countries.”).
405
ABA, supra note 404, at 6–7, 12.
406
See supra subpart III.D.
407
MANIN, supra note 304, at 155.
408
Michael Dorf explores, but does not hold, this view. See Michael Dorf,
WWJHED (What Would John Hart Ely Do) About Campaign Finance Regulation?,
DORF ON LAW (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/09/wwjhedwhat-would-john-hart-ely-do.html [https://perma.cc/E56G-T77C].
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Leveling up strategies are perhaps most common in campaign finance and lobbying reform proposals. The traditional
approach to curtailing the influence of the wealthy is through
campaign finance and lobbying restrictions.409 But there is
another approach: giving more power to the usually disempowered. Thus, campaign finance reform strategies like
public financing through matching funds or grants,410 or more
radically, proposals for campaign funding vouchers411 all seek
to increase the influence of those without deep pockets. Similarly, scholars have suggested leveling up in the lobbying context, either through research consultants for legislators, akin
to public interest lobbyists that provide information,412 or
through a public defender approach for lobbying by public interest organizations.413 Interestingly, some studies have also
shown that compulsory voting—a system that levels up power
at the ballot box—leads to a decrease in inequality and increased income for the bottom quintiles of the population.414
Another example is recent proposals attempting to increase the political power of labor unions. Labor unions have
“play[ed] a significant role in the political mobilization of those
who, on the basis of their income and education, might otherwise not take part politically.”415 Labor unions mobilize voters,
engage in lobbying efforts, and are significant campaign contributors, and historically, they have been behind much of the
legislative efforts focused on benefitting lower- and middle-income Americans, whether or not they are in a union.416 The
challenge is that union membership is declining, and in the
political realm, there is increased hostility to unions and collective bargaining.417 In this context, some have argued for in409

See supra section IV.B.1.
For an overview of state public financing programs, see National Conference of State Legislatures, Overview of State Laws on Public Financing, Jan. 23,
2013, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing
-of-campaigns-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/QU6D-6W3F].
411
BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS 142 (2002); LESSIG,
supra note 13, at 265–69.
412
Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 350, at 87–89.
413
Dorie Apollonio, Bruce E. Cain, & Lee Drutman, Access and Lobbying:
Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS L.Q. 13, 46 (2008).
414
Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize
Incomes?, 20 ECON. & POL. 391, 412–13 (2008).
415
SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY
384 (1995).
416
For a history of some of the critical developments, see JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR
ALL THESE RIGHTS 149–51 (2003).
417
DAVID MADLAND, KARLA WALTER & NICK BUNKER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION
FUND, UNIONS MAKE THE MIDDLE CLASS: WITHOUT UNIONS, THE MIDDLE CLASS WITHERS
1 (2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/
410
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creased attention to “minority unions,” unions composed of a
minority of a workforce that choose to be members.418 Minority
unions are not exclusive collective bargaining entities, but they
allow members to organize and represent their own interests.
Professor Ben Sachs has recently argued for “unbundling” the
union’s functions to separate political and collective bargaining
purposes.419 His hope is that workers could create “political
unions” that will be able to exercise countervailing political
power vis-à-vis the wealthy.
D. Bypassing the Political Process
The final category of solutions seeks to bypass the traditional separation of powers constitutional structure, and erect
new institutions that can prevent elite capture. Political parties and the bureaucracy are two examples of this final design
strategy.
1. Political Parties
Recent scholarship has stressed how political parties can
undermine the proper (or at least theoretically proper) functioning of the separation of powers.420 When one party has
total control over the different branches of government and
partisan preferences trump an individual’s identification with
their political institution, the separation of powers fails to offer
meaningful checks on political action.421 Separation of parties,
that is, divided government, might therefore be more meaningful than the separation of powers. This important insight must
be tempered by the possibility that both parties will be captured by economic elites.422 Interestingly, however, on some
theories, parties themselves can actually play a role in combating elite economic power.
As Professor Nancy Rosenblum has shown, the “holistic”
tradition in political thought sees the community as a unified
whole, and generally opposes parties—except when there is a
“party to end parties.”423 Partisans will create a party that they
04/pdf/unionsmakethemiddleclass.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VJR-E8Q2]; Karla
Walter & Jackie Odum, The Assault on Unions Is Hurting All Workers, NEWSWEEK
(May 14, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/assault-unions-hurting-all-workers331991 [https://perma.cc/NTS3-TUCJ].
418
CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK 8–9 (2005).
419
Sachs, supra note 16, at 155–57.
420
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2313.
421
Id. at 2315–16.
422
See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text.
423
NANCY ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF ANGELS 36–67 (2008).
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claim represents the whole of the society, as opposed to other
factions that do not speak for the united community.424 The
party’s goal is to bring an end to politics through its domination.425 The party offers a structure to counteract economic
powers that are seen as capturing and corrupting the political
system. Because it exists outside of the (corrupted) structures
of government, the party becomes a way to oversee and check
elites in government, or better yet, to wrest control of the government from the elites and give it to the people.426
Consider a few examples. With the rise of finance in
London in the early eighteenth century, Robert Walpole began
using executive patronage to reshape the balance of power in
English politics by making the different branches of the government interdependent.427 Opponents of Walpole, like Henry St.
John, Viscount Bolingbroke, argued that a “country” party
needed to play the role of mobilized opposition against the corrupt, self-interested “court” of professional politicians.428 Another example is the rise of the American party system.429
During the Jacksonian Era, the efforts to create a mass, mobilized Democratic Party were tied, in part, to opposition to the
Bank of the United States and the power of economic elites.430
Channeling the holistic approach Rosenblum describes, Jacksonian partisans even described themselves as “the Democracy,” to show their commitment to replacing elite rule with the
rule of the people at large.431 Martin Van Buren, who was the
critical figure in the creation of Jackson’s Democratic Party,
described the need for the Party: the Democracy would fight
“the selfish and contracted rule of a judicial oligarchy, which,
sympathizing in feeling and acting in concert with the money
424

Id.
Id. at 38.
426
There is some overlap between parties as a bypassing tool and a leveling up
tool. I separate the two here, because theorists have thought about parties as
serving an institutional corrective to a flawed separation of powers system.
427
ISAAC KRAMNICK, BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE: THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA IN
THE AGE OF WALPOLE 119–24 (1968).
428
BOLINGBROKE, POLITICAL WRITINGS 37 (David Armitage ed., 1997) (noting that
the country party must be “formed on principles of common interest” and is
opposed to “the prejudices and interests of particular sets of men”).
429
See generally GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS (2002) (giving an account of the rise of party politics in the United States); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM (1960) (same).
430
See generally Major L. Wilson, The “Country” Versus the “Court”: A Republican Consensus and Party Debate in the Bank War, 15 J. EARLY REP. 619 (1995)
(tying the Jacksonian Party organization to the war over the Bank of the United
States and fears of “court” corruption).
431
ROSENBLUM, supra note 423, at 54–55.
425
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power, would assuredly subvert the best features of a political
system that needs only to be honestly administered.”432 Van
Buren even analogized explicitly to Bolingbroke’s experience
fighting “the money power” in England a century earlier.433 For
Van Buren, the Democratic Party would be an extra-governmental vehicle that could operate across geography, time,
branches of government, and candidates, to ensure the rule of
the people rather than the elites. As Frederick Grimke, writing
in 1848, explained, “parties take the place of the old system of
balances and checks. The latter balance the government only,
the former balance society itself.”434 In balancing society, the
Democratic Party counteracted the power of elites.
2. The Bureaucratic State
A final strategy for countering elite economic influence is to
bypass the political system with institutions that are insulated
from economic influence. Although the common way of thinking about bureaucracies is rooted in technical expertise,435 the
rise of the bureaucracy was intimately interconnected with the
rise of economically powerful actors in society—and seen at the
time as a mechanism for combating their power. In a sense,
the bureaucratic approach comes directly from Madison’s point
that “you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”436 For
the advocates of the bureaucratic state in the early twentieth
century, the fundamental issue was that government could no
longer control the governed.
In the Progressive Era, Theodore Roosevelt’s vision of government regulating economic power provided a contrast to
Brandeis’s philosophy of breaking up concentrated economic
power. Where Brandeis and Woodrow Wilson saw antitrust as
a strategy for restraining industrial behemoths, Roosevelt argued for expanded national authority: “Big business has become nationalized and the only effective way of controlling and
432
MARTIN VAN BUREN, THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 376 (1867).
433
Id. at 162–63.
434
FREDERICK GRIMKE, CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE
INSTITUTIONS 105 (1848).
435
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1276, 1318–22 (1984); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (1975); Cass. R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 441–42 (1987); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2352–58 (2001).
436
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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directing it and preventing the abuses in connection with it is
by having the people nationalize the governmental control in
order to meet the nationalization of the big business itself.”437
Roosevelt recognized that growth of economic power was an
inevitable part of capitalism, so the path forward was not “in
attempting to prevent such combinations, but in completely
controlling them in the interest of the public welfare.”438
This same impetus is evident in the massive expansion of
the bureaucracy associated with the New Deal order. For the
New Dealers, the common law was itself a regulatory system,
with judges rather than legislatures taking the primary role in
making policy choices about economic power in society.439 Economic transformations in the early twentieth century and the
Great Depression demonstrated that the common law was insufficient: it overprotected “the rights of private property” and
underprotected the “interests of the poor, consumers of dangerous food and drugs, the elderly, traders on securities markets, and victims of unfair trade practices.”440
In crafting the bureaucratic state, the New Dealers were
concerned with accumulation of private power in society and
its ability to oppress individuals. In The Administrative Process, for example, James Landis roots the administrative state
in the “rise of industrialism” and the “rise of democracy.”441 He
argued that there were “concentrations of power on a scale that
beggars the ambitions of the Stuarts” and that government
action was necessary because “certain enterprises possess
such great public significance that their pursuit and control
cannot be intrusted to private industry.”442 The common law
was insufficient because it was not enough to “presume[ ] the
existence of an equality” between individuals such that common law litigation led to evenhanded treatment.443 In fact, “the
absence of equal economic power generally is so prevalent that
the umpire theory of administering law is almost certain to
fail.”444 The common law regulatory system had to be overturned because the “accumulation of such unredressed claims
is of itself a serious social threat,” one that demanded “positive
solutions” and a government that “maintain[ed] continuing
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444

Theodore Roosevelt, Speech in Denver, Colo., Aug. 29, 1910.
Theodore Roosevelt, Speech in Osawatomie, Kan., Aug. 31, 1910.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, supra note 435, at 437.
Id. at 438.
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7 (1938).
Id. at 46, 120.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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concern with and control over the economic forces which affect
the life of the community.”445
Viewed in this light, expertise is more than a restraint on
bureaucratic discretion for fear of unchecked government
power;446 it is a strategy to prevent capture from economically
powerful actors in society. A professional, expert-driven civil
service should insulate policymaking from political and economic influence. Because civil servants are chosen for their
technical knowledge, rather than by election, political preferences, or connections, they will be less likely to cower to influence. Expertise is therefore both limiting, in constraining
government action, and empowering, in constraining political
influence over decisionmaking.447
The motivation underlying this strand of Progressive and
New Deal thought is instructive as a matter of design. It suggests that contemporary attention to protecting bureaucratic
independence and preventing agency capture448 may be a
promising way to rebalance government policymaking away
from economic elites. It also focuses attention on other design
possibilities that are rooted in the idea of a professional system
of public administration: expanding the civil service vis-à-vis
political appointees,449 extending terms of office for higher officials,450 and restricting revolving door employment between
agencies and their regulated industries.451 At the same time,
however, it raises concerns about the erosion of the professional, independent bureaucracy through privatization and
contracting. If bureaucracy is a cure for the problem of economic power, the use of economically powerful actors in imple445

Id. at 36, 8.
Frug, supra note 435, at 1318–22.
447
Id.
448
For recent work on agency independence, see generally Adrian Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Rachel E.
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 156.
449
For an argument in favor of civil service reform that would lead to greater
professionalization of the bureaucracy, see Francis Fukuyama, Why We Need a
New Pendleton Act, AM. INTEREST (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.the-american-inter
est.com/2013/11/03/why-we-need-a-new-pendleton-act/ [https://perma.cc/
5F7F-JFB9].
450
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2378.
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See generally Wilmarth, supra note 291 (discussing the revolving door in
the financial regulation context).
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menting public policy might require a new system of checks
and balances.452
CONCLUSION
In light of the persistent problems facing constitutional
design regarding economic power, it is unlikely that the reality
of elite economic domination can simply be “solved” through
institutional design. Any institutional design strategy will need
to be evaluated based on its plausibility and effectiveness, and
the unfortunate reality is that strategies to grapple with economic power face serious tradeoffs along these lines. Some
strategies, like switching from elections to lottery, might be
more effective but are implausible to the point of being fantastical. Other strategies, like antitrust-style regulation to break up
powerful corporations, are more plausible but less effective. In
addition, every strategy suffers from one or more of the persistent problems of economic power.
Still, the answer is not despair. While no single strategy is
a silver bullet, the possible strategies are also not ineffectual or
mutually exclusive. Each can serve as a complement along
with others, and an overall approach to grappling with economic power in constitutional design will likely need to incorporate a variety of strategies to different degrees. In this sense,
any design that confronts economic power will likely follow the
theory of the second-best.453 In the most casual sense, a second-best approach suggests that optimal policies might not be
possible, but suboptimal policies might still be helpful in advancing the desired aims. More formally, the theory of the
second-best holds that suboptimal designs in any particular
area can be combined to reach an overall design that is “as
close as possible to the ideal.”454 It is a fallacy of division to
assume that for the overall system to feature political equality
along economic lines, every component of the system must also
have that feature.455
For example, assume that the optimal solution to economic
power’s influence is campaign finance reform along lines that
safeguard politics. Campaign finance reform suffers from the
452
See generally Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515 (2015) (setting out “[a] theory of an enduring,
evolving separation of powers” that “checks and balances state power in whatever
form that power happens to take”).
453
For the classic work in economics, see generally R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
454
VERMEULE, SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 123, at 30.
455
Id. at 9.
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hydraulic problem, among others, so economic power will still
find a way to influence politics. A second-best approach might
thus combine campaign finance restrictions with efforts to
combat economic inequality upstream from the political process and an administrative state composed of experts, with
restrictions attempting to prevent capture of the bureaucracy
as well. While this multi-pronged effort will not be perfect, it
would narrow the scope and avenues of elite domination. The
point is that without attention to the system as a whole, each of
the persistent problems looms larger.
Despite widespread contemporary interest and attention to
issues of economic power and inequality, constitutional theory
has been surprisingly silent about the power of economic elites
over policymaking. This silence is puzzling given a robust and
extensive political science literature demonstrating that economic elites dominate the American political system, the historical tradition of constitutional theory engaging the problem
of economic power, and claims that the Madisonian system
prevents factional tyranny. But the consequence of silence is
that leading constitutional theories over the last few decades
are strikingly limited, even on their own terms. Moreover, while
there are a number of approaches to mitigating the influence of
economic power, any attempt to design institutions to address
the influence of elite economic power will face persistent, pervasive, and perverse problems. Going forward, constitutional
theorists will not only need to recognize the reality of economic
power, but also its persistence.

